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THE SOCIO-LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES: A CLOSE LOOK AT ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
Gaia Bemstein*
Abstract: Heated debates often surround the introduction of an important new technology
into society, as exemplified by current controversies surrounding human cloning and privacy
protection on the Internet. Underlying these controversies are disruptions to central socio-
legal values caused by these new technologies. Whether new technologies will eventually be
accepted by society is often contingent on the reaction of the legal system. This mandates the
formulation of a conceptual framework for understanding and structuring the way the law
should react in cases surrounding the adoption of new technologies. By using the case study
of artificial insemination this Article develops the tools for structuring the legal role in the
acceptance process of new technologies. The three-century controversy surrounding the
innovation of artificial insemination results from the innovations' disruption of the socio-legal
value of the family. Artificial Insemination-although invented in the eighteenth-century-
was rarely used until the 1930s, and only legalized in the 1960s. Its application to surrogacy
and its use by unmarried women extends the controversy into the twenty-first century. The
case study demonstrates the nature of the relationship among the technological, social and
legal acceptance processes of new technologies, and analyzes the legal acceptance debate.
The conceptual framework produced is useful in understanding and structuring the legal role
in current debates surrounding the introduction and acceptance of new technologies.
TRODUCTION
Much legal study has been devoted to the innovation of new
technologies, in particular to the structuring of the appropriate legal
regime for encouraging novelty. The next stage-the diffusion of
innovations-the process by which an innovation gains widespread
adoption-was studied by legal scholars mainly from the economic
perspective. Legal writings dealing with other aspects of the diffusion
process are scarce. The discussion of diffusion has failed to sufficiently
account for the much broader struggle which often takes place whenever
a controversial innovation enters society.
* J.S.D. Candidate and Donald Brown Fellow, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy,
New York University School of Law; e-mail: gb425@nyu.edu. The author is greatly indebted to
Yochai Benkler for his many insightful comments and continued encouragement. The author would
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These struggles are evidenced in recent debates, such as the
controversy surrounding human cloning. Human cloning brings with it
great scientific promise. It offers the possibility of replicating a child for
an infertile couple or for a couple who has lost a child. It also presents
the option of rebuilding new organs to replace diseased ones and
providing perfectly matched cell implants to arrest such degenerative
diseases as arthritis and Alzheimer's. Yet concerns regarding the birth of
defective babies, the production of human clones to harvest organs, and
fear of a eugenic attempt to develop the perfect race impede the
application of cloning technology to human subjects. Currently, twenty-
three countries, including the United States, ban some aspect of human
cloning.'
This Article sheds light on current debates by formulating the
foundation of a new conceptual approach for understanding the process
through which an innovation is accepted by law and society. The Article
focuses on a significant obstacle often facing the diffusion process of
new technologies where the values embedded in the technology are
incompatible with the corresponding socio-legal values, norms, and
institutes.
The approach adopted in this Article is of a broad interactionist nature.
Its underlying proposition is that the legal acceptance process should not
be studied and cannot be comprehended in isolation. The Article
examines the reciprocal interaction between the structural components of
technology and the relevant social norms and legal concepts. It seeks to
demonstrate the significance of studying the full range of these
interactions for understanding the acceptance process of technology in
society. This interactionist approach sets the stage for the Article's
second objective, the conceptualization of the processes of acceptance of
a new technology in law as they relate to processes of acceptance in the
technological and social spheres. Particularly, the Article seeks to
identify the qualities which characterize this legal debate and affect both
its agenda and its outcome.
The Article utilizes the long struggle of the invention of artificial
insemination in humans (AI) to gain socio-legal acceptance as a basis for
the inquiry. In particular, it will focus upon the incompatibility of the
technology of AI and the prevailing concept of the socio-legal institute of
1. See Human-Cloning Try Nears as Company Spurns Rules, USA TODAY, Apr. 5,2001, at 10A;
Editorial, On Cloning, United States Should Keep FDA Ban, NEWSDAY, Apr. 1, 2001, at B3;
Editorial, Reasons Not to Clone, WASH. POST, Apr. 1,2001, at B6.
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the family. AI makes it possible, in cases of infertility, to impregnate
women through the simple procedure of the injection of sperm. The
injected sperm is either the husband's or a donor's depending on the
cause of infertility. While the first documented reports of AI in humans
are from the end of the eighteenth-century, the innovation was forgotten
and rarely used until the 1930s. Furthermore, despite a long process of
legalization and legitimization, the technology is to this day in the center
of a social and legal controversy.
Like more recent debates, the story of the technology of AI is for
better or for worse, a tale of repeated human choice. The history of AI
illustrates that technology is not self-determining, it is not a means which
overcomes the end, thus, impeding human freedom.2 To the contrary,
choice is repeatedly manifest through the interplay between social norms
and legal defensive mechanisms, which act to inhibit the acceptance of
new technology, and legal rules accommodating the new technology
which are driven by its proponents and beneficiaries.
At the same time, the tale of AI contains its dark side. It is also the
story of an abandoned innovation, of a rejected dissertation, of imposed
silence, of dark secrets and shame and to this day-of discrimination
against those considered "unfit" to use the technology. Most of all, it is a
tale of lost opportunities for the many infertile people who were
sterilized by society. This aspect of the history of AI underscores the
pertinence of identifying and bringing to the forefront the mechanisms
underlying the socio-legal struggle for acceptance, particularly in those
cases where the technology causes perturbation of existing socio-legal
values, norms or institutes.
This Article follows a hybrid analytic-historical framework. Part I
seeks to assess the nature of the socio-legal acceptance process. It also
outlines the conceptual framework that will be used to examine the legal
acceptance debate. It defines the qualities which can influence the legal
debate. Finally, it focuses on AI and describes the socio-legal institute
which stands at the center of the AI controversy-the family-and the
legal tools at its disposal.
The rest of the Article traces the history of AI's acceptance process
while seeking to illustrate-through the examination of the interaction
between the technological, social, and legal spheres-the mechanisms
2. For a discussion of a version of the deterministic view of technology, see generally Jacques
Ellul, The Technological Order, in PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 86 (Carl Mitcham & Robert
Mackey eds., 1972).
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which influenced the legal acceptance debate. Part II covers the first
period, "The Early Days of Artificial Insemination." This part describes
the early history of Al encompassing a period running from the first AI
tales, as early as the second century, to the mid 1930s. This was a period
in which Al, although known, was barely in use due mainly to prevailing
moral inhibitions which viewed the use of Al as an intrusion on
traditional family relations.
Part III covers the second period, "From Moral Condemnation to
Popular Practice." It encompasses an era commencing in the mid-1930s
and ending at the beginning of the 1960s. During this time, use of AI
evolved from limited public use to popular use. Use of AI kept
expanding despite persistent moral condemnation and legal uncertainty
acting to preserve the traditional organic family unit. This expansion was
due to the efforts of the physicians who mitigated between these
inhibiting forces and the desire of infertile couples to use the technology.
Part IV covers "An Era of Legalization," which focuses mainly on the
1960s-1970s but also addresses the continued process of legalization
throughout the rest of the twentieth-century. It describes an era of
increasing popularization caused mainly by the long awaited legalization
of the basic Al practice, through the enactment of applicable statutes.
Part V, "Rocking the Boat," covers a period starting in the 1970s and
continuing to this day. During this period, despite legalization, the
technology of Al found itself again in the midst of controversy. Two new
uses enflamed the social and legal debate by threatening to disintegrate
the socio-legal notions of a family. These were the use of AI by single
women and lesbians and the application of the technology to the practice
of surrogacy. These controversies are still not resolved. The Article
concludes by reflecting upon the implications of the case study's findings
for the formulation of policy decisions regarding current technological
controversies.
I. ACCEPTANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Acceptance Process
This section will first define the nature of the acceptance process as it
is composed from the technological, social, and legal arenas. Second, it
will provide an analytic framework for the legal acceptance process.
1038
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1. The General Nature of the Acceptance Process
Legal academic writing traditionally differentiates between three
stages through which a new technology progresses. The first stage is
invention, which is the technical discovery. The second stage is
innovation, which is the first commercially successful application of a
new technology. The third is diffusion, which is the widespread adoption
of a commercially successful product.3 Of chief importance is the
distinction between innovation and diffusion.4 Legal scholars have
identified diffusion as a distinct stage in technological progress. Yet,
despite the acknowledgment of the existence of a separate diffusion
stage, legal writing on the issue of diffusion is restricted to an economic
analysis of the diffusion process. Furthermore, legal studies concerning
the diffusion stage tend to focus solely on the effects of laws directly
aimed at regulating the technology.' This Article extends the scope of the
study of the diffusion process. In particular, it encompasses
circumstances where the value embedded in the technology is
incompatible with the correspondent socio-legal value, norm or institute.
This Article highlights the broad nature of the diffusion stage and
consequently its significant implications to societal technological
progress. The diffusion stage is treated throughout this Article as the
acceptance process of a specific technology by individuals, groups or
other adopting units, that is particular to a specific social structure, value
3. The most significant use of these categories in legal writing was done in the field of
environmental law. See generally Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the
Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVwL. L REv. 419, 419 n.1 (1985); Natalie M. Derzko, Using
Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of
Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENvTL. L REV. 3 (1996); Michael A. Gollin, Using
Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 193, 197-98
(1991); Kathleen M. Rest & Nicholas A. Ashford, Regulation and Technological Options: The Case
of Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 1 HARV. J.L & TECH. 63, 65 (1988).
4. This dichotomy was also used by legal academics and, although again mainly applied in the
field of environmental law, it was also relied upon in writings dealing with intellectual property. See,
e.g., Robert M. Friedman et al., Comment, Environmental Policy Instrument Choice: The Challenge
of Competing Goals, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 327, 365-68 (2000); Dana R. Wagner, The
Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the Regulatory Implications of Systems
Technology, 51 HAsTINGS L.J. 1073, 1109-10 (2000).
5. See generally, Ashford et al., supra note 3; Friedman et al., supra note 4; Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L & ECON. 265 (1977). See, e.g., Peter S.
Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 94
COLUM. L REv. 2644,2646 (1994).
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system or culture and modes of communication.6 Specifically, once an
innovation enters society it is influenced by more than economic forces
driven by competitive considerations and laws targeted at the
technological makeup of the innovation. Societal values, norms, or
institutes and their legal manifestations that were not originally formed to
apply to the technology in question may force the technology to be
altered or even completely rejected. The introduction of the technology,
in turn, may apply pressure to change the relevant social norms and
correlated laws. These interactions are of particular significance where a
chasm appears between a value embedded in the technology and its
socio-legal manifestation.
It is this reciprocal process-the process of socio-legal acceptance-
that this Article sets out to study. The Article seeks to demonstrate the
significance of studying the interaction between the technological, social
and legal spheres for understanding the process through which an
innovation is accepted in society. The structural component of the
technology interacts with the relevant social values and legal concepts.
This interaction determines society's acceptance of the use of the
technology.
The notion of acceptance is conceived of as fluid, not necessarily
permanent or complete. This is not to say that acceptance cannot at times
reach complete stabilization, that is, a final form, which will cease
evolving. For example, the structure of the bicycle, although undergoing
different forms in the past such as the three-wheel format, has now
reached a final form, which is no longer debated.7 This form of
stabilization is possible although not uniform in the technological sphere.
Nevertheless, socio-legal (and at times, even technological) acceptance is
often of a less structured and finalized nature.
In examining the nature of the acceptance of innovations, it is
important to define at the forefront the nature of the subject matter which
6. See Elihu Katz & Martin L. Levin, Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of Innovation, 28(2)
AM. Soc. REv. 237, 240 (1963). The process oriented approach is distinguished from academic
writings focusing on the specific focal influence of a certain technology on a socio-legal value. See,
e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1432 (2000).
7. This form of technological stability was coined by the Philosophy of Technology Social
Constructivist Movement as closure. The term closure was used to explain the process through
which a technological innovation reaches its final form. Closure occurs when a scientific controversy
surrounding an innovation is terminated and scientific facts are created. From that moment on only
one interpretation about the meaning of the innovation can be accepted by all. See WIEBE E. BUKER,
OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES AND BULBS 84-88 (1995).
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is being accepted.8 Technology may remain structurally the same while
its social uses evolve. However, the distinction between the technical
structure or procedure and its eventual use has proven to be over-
simplified for the realities of the socio-legal acceptance process. An
innovation has not two but three layers, each of which could potentially
stand at the focus of the socio-legal acceptance analysis. These layers
are: (1) the technological structure or procedure, (2) the technology's
social implication and (3) the technology's application.' Of these three
layers it is the technology's social implication which is the focal point of
the acceptance process. The social implication of the technology
represents a bias that is inherent in the technology itself. Should society
choose to adopt rather than reject the technology, it will be impacted by
its inherent social implication, regardless of the specific application used.
In the case of AI, the technology's applications evolved over the years
and, as will be discussed, included: the impregnation of infertile women
with a husband or a donor's sperm, the impregnation of single women
with a donor's sperm, and the application of the technology to the
practice of surrogacy. Yet, it is not any of these four applications whose
acceptance is directly at issue. Instead, at stake is something much more
inherent in the basis of the technology. The technological procedure of
Al consists of the injection of sperm into a woman for the purpose of
impregnating her, thereby enabling procreation without the traditional
8. Two other issues related to the scope of the inquiry should be addressed. The first concerns the
subject matter of the acceptance process-whether a single innovation such as Al should be
examined in isolation or whether it should be studied as part of the cluster of reproductive
technologies. The choice to focus exclusively on the technology of AI should not bias the current
exercise. It is noted, however, that the acceptance process of isolated innovations, as opposed to the
acceptance of clusters of technologies, deserves independent consideration which is outside the
scope of this exercise. The second issue relates to the geographic-cultural scope of the inquiry. Since
the acceptance process depends on the effects of an innovation on a relevant set of socio-legal
norms, the inquiry in this Article is limited mainly to the influences of Al within the United States. It
may be that for certain technologies the acceptance process can be studied on a more global basis.
However, since social values and their correlated legal manifestations tend to vary between cultures
this study will not endeavor beyond the process as it takes place in the United States.
9. On the multi-layered notion of the innovation, see EvERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF
INNOVATIONS 423 (4th ed. 1995) (differentiating between:form-the directly observable physical
appearance and substance of an innovation;function-the contribution made by an innovation to the
way of life of members of a social system; and meaning-the subjective and frequently unconscious
perception of an innovation which often alternates between social settings); MARSHALL MCLUHAN,
UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7-21 (1964) (distinguishing between the
medium-which is the message which shapes and controls the scale and form of human association
and action and the content-which is merely another medium and which blinds us to the character of
the medium).
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resort to sexual intercourse between a married couple. The social
implication at issue in the case of Al is, therefore, the ability to create
children without sexual intercourse between a man and a woman,
traditionally consummated within the nuclear family. This ability placed
the family value embedded in the technology at odds with the prevailing
socio-legal conception of the family. The family value embedded in Al
enabled family structures that were incompatible with the nuclear
genetically related socio-legal conception of the family. It is this conflict
between the alternative values of the family which runs through the
history of AI and which society struggles to resolve. The different
applications, such as the application of AI to surrogacy, are merely its
extensions. Hence, it is the socio-legal acceptance of the inherent social
implications of different technologies which are at the core of the
acceptance process.
2. Analyzing the Legal Acceptance Process: Technological Visibility
and Technological Frames of Meaning
This Article seeks not only to expose the comprehensive nature of the
general acceptance process, but also addresses the nature of the legal
acceptance process.' ° Two qualities particularly distinguish the legal
acceptance debate: (1) the extent of technological visibility, and (2) the
role played by technological frames of meaning.
Technological visibility refers to the extent to which the functional or
procedural elements of the technology are at the center of the legal
debate. For example, in the judicial arena, whether the technology is at
the focus of the debate is determined by the portion of the judgment
dedicated to the description of the details of its structure or procedure.
Where the court dedicates a substantial part of the judgment to the
description of these elements, the technology can be considered to be
visible. When the facts involving the technology are at forefront of the
10. The conception of acceptance in law throughout this Article is heavily influenced by the
Social Constructivist concept of procedural closure. According to the Social Constructivists,
procedural closure takes place if a controversy is terminated through formal procedurally governed
efforts. A correct resolution is not required and considerable disagreement among the disputing
parties may be sustained indefinitely. This form of closure works only temporarily because it does
not reach the deeper layer of the controversy. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Ethical Theory and the
Problem of Closure, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES 27,30-31 (H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr. & Arthur
L. Caplan eds., 1987); H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr. & Arthur L. Caplan, Patterns of Controversy and
Closure: The Interplay of Knowledge, Values and Political Forces, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES,
supra, at 1, 5.
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court's judgment, people remain consciously aware of the fact that a new
technology is the source of any social consequences that took place.
Furthermore, the outcome of the case will usually be strongly related to
the nature of these technological facts. In contrast, where the court
merely mentions that the technology was used and focuses the judgment
not on the technological details but on the social ramifications of such
use, the technology can be considered to be invisible." In these cases,
lack of attention to the technology removes it from people's
consciousness and the outcome is usually not related to the technological
features but to the social ramifications of a particular application.
Technological visibility tends to run on a spectrum, and thus is not
necessarily completely visible or completely invisible. Where the
technology is highly visible, the legal debate is likely to focus on features
which are central to the technology. For example, in the case of a
reproductive technology, courts will focus on the artificial nature of the
procedure as opposed to the natural act of sexual intercourse or upon
technicalities such as whose sperm is used, whose ova is utilized, and
where the union and growth takes place. Further along the spectrum,
where technology is less visible, the legal debate will focus upon
qualities which are ancillary to the technology. For example, in the case
of reproductive technologies, the legal determinations will concentrate
upon features such as the intentions of the parties seeking conception
through artificial reproduction and the lengthy time period during which
the treatments often take place.
Another type of legal debate, which represents a form of technological
visibility, takes place when an argument defined here as the continuity
argument is invoked. This form of technological visibility occurs where
a new use has evolved for a technology which has already gained certain
socio-legal acceptance. In such cases, technological visibility will be
manifested in the legal debate through the argument that the new
application stems from the use of the very same technology which
already gained acceptance. Where such argument is accepted by the
court, attention will be given to the technological features of the
innovation and not merely to the social ramifications of the new use.
11. A description of a certain form of technological invisibility appears in Alan Borgmann's
distinction between a thing and a device. Borgmann explains that a thing is indistinct from its
context A stove for example, was also afocus-a place around which the family congregated for
work or leisure. On the other hand, a device, such as the central heating provides warmth and
disburdens us of all the other elements. The machinery of the device becomes concealed. See
ALBERT BORGMANN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY LIFE 41 (1984).
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At the other extreme of the spectrum lie cases of technological
invisibility. Where the technology is invisible it will be mentioned as part
of the factual pattern, but its technological features will not be at issue. In
the case of reproductive technologies, courts could mention that the child
was conceived through the relevant reproductive technology, but the
factual pattern laid out will not contain any features of the technology.
It is important to pause here and explain the significance of the
technological visibility feature to the study of the legal acceptance
debate. It should be noted that this Article does not undertake to
determine the relationship between the visibility of the technology and
the outcome of the legal acceptance debate, that is, whether technological
visibility or invisibility is more likely to enhance the acceptance of the
technology."2 In highlighting the technological visibility factor in the
legal acceptance debate, the objective is to expose the relationship
between potential legal arguments and the degree of technological
visibility. The study of the legal discourse (in particular the type of
arguments taken into account) and the identification of the desirable form
of such discourse are often as important as the study of the relevant legal
outcomes. In considering the alternative forms of the legal acceptance
debate, neither technological visibility nor technological invisibility
stands out as a preferable form of the debate.
Technological visibility may enable the acceleration of the acceptance
of a new use of the technology through the employment of the continuity
argument. At the same time, it may conceal and therefore prevent an
open debate on the social consequences of the technology. On the other
hand, technological invisibility, while not obstructing the view of the
social ramifications, does not necessarily guarantee an open debate of the
real issues at stake. Furthermore, technological invisibility may induce
differential treatment for different applications of the same technology
where visibility would have highlighted potential injustice or irrationality
of such contradictory determinations. Thus, it would be undesirable to
settle on either technological visibility or technological invisibility as the
single best form of debate. Neither is desirable as the sole form for
controlling the debate. As described, technological visibility consists of a
spectrum. This Article will study the potential shades of visibility and
12. This is not to say that the relationship between the outcome of the debate and the extent of
technological visibility is not of significance to the study of the legal acceptance process.
Nevertheless, drawing such conclusions on the basis of the one case study featured in this Article
would be premature.
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their consequences. Only then can choices be made with regard to the
degree of technological visibility suitable for the legal acceptance debate.
The second quality, which plays a major part in the legal acceptance
debate, is the role of the "technological frames of meaning." A
technological frame of meaning guides one's thinking and interaction
with any given technology. At the same time, it constrains the freedom of
those who hold it because it constrains their perception and, therefore,
their use of the technology. 3 The process of socio-legal acceptance is
usually characterized by several frames of meaning held by different
participants in the debate, and the one that prevails often influences the
outcome of the debate. For example, in the case of reproduction
technologies two different frames of meaning tend to control the
debate-the frame of meaning of cure and the frame of meaning of
choice. Those advocating the technology would utilize the frame of
meaning of cure and argue that the technology constitutes a medical cure
for infertility.
Those objecting to the technology would argue that the technology is
not a necessary remedy for a medical condition but is merely a matter of
a life choice preference.'4 Whether the technology is viewed as a medical
cure for infertility or as a matter of choice has a significant effect on the
debate.'" The influential power of the frames of meaning is enhanced by
the fact that some groups have a considerable ability to mobilize
acceptance for the new technology and the domination of their
technological frame of meaning has a significant effect on the outcome
of the debate. Consequently, identifying the frames of meaning and their
role in the debate can provide an important explanatory power in the
study of the acceptance process.
B. The Family: An Institute Under Pressure
In practice, the socio-legal acceptance process occurs in the
adjustment of the relevant socio-legal values or institutions to the new
13. See BUKER, supra note 7, at 191-92.
14. Although the frame of meaning of choice has traditionally played a positive role in women's
struggle for autonomy it was used differently in this technological arena. It was on this battleground
that women tried to escape the connotations of choice in favor of the protective realm of a cure for
disease.
15. On "the disease as a socially created reality," see IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE
EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 117-18 (1975).
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technology. 6 The main socio-legal institute influenced through the
innovation of AI is the institution of the family. 7 Historically-and to
this day-the family is considered by many to be the natural form for the
social organization of intimacy.'" The unit is organized around the
nuclear family which is based on the sexual affiliation between a man
and a woman. New alternatives to the nuclear family are often cast as
threatening and dangerous."
Use of AI technology created alternatives to the traditional organic
family unit of a father, a mother and a child who are genetically related.
Although adoption was a recognized alternative, the new technology
significantly enhanced the range of available alternatives. These included
a father who is not the natural father, a single parent family of one
mother, a two lesbian mother family, and a two gay father family. The
new alternatives were viewed as artificially constructed and unnatural in
contrast to the nuclear, genetically related family.20 The reluctance to
accept these alternative technologically constructed forms stemmed from
inhibitions related to the reliance on the traditional organic unit as one of
the foundations of societal order. Progress or setbacks in the socio-legal
acceptance of AI are thus reflected in the flexibility of the socio-legal
institution of the family and its readiness to encompass within its
emblem the technologically constructed alternatives.
16. See DAVID ELLIOTr & RUTH ELLIOTT, THE CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY vii (1976) (arguing
that the choice to use one technology over another or to apply a technology for a certain end relates
to the underlying societal scheme of values and priorities).
17. The debate around Al raised additional issues in the socio-legal arena. These included the
concern with regard to eugenics and safety issues related to the selection of the donor, such as the
dangers of HIV and genetic defects, and the consequent liability of the physician. The focus for the
sake of this exercise is narrower. It is an attempt to analyze, throughout the relevant historical
period, the net of interactions relating to one socio-legal concept-the family. Furthermore, the
inquiry is also limited to the legal and social consequences which eventually took place. It does not
expand to include issues such as the possibility of incest, which was implicated primarily in the legal
scholarly debate but never became an actual part of the controversy.
18. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145 (1995).
19. See id. at146.
20. This is not to say that the traditional nuclear family is natural. Like its newly technologically
created alternatives, its existence was enforced by law and society. However, due to the illusion of
neutrality cultivated over the years, it was viewed by many as natural in contrast to the
technologically derived forms that were considered socially constructed. On the socially constructed
nature of the nuclear genetic family, see generally JACQUES DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES
(Robert Hurley trans., Random House 1979) (1977); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND
THE FAMILY (1989).
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The nuclear genetic family is a socio-legal construct, which at the
same time enhances the socio-legal mechanisms which created it and
continue to supplement it. One traditional means of maintaining the
nuclear family unit was through the use of social taboos aimed at
preventing women from conducting sexual relations outside the family.2
The law enhanced these social taboos. This was done, as is often the
habit of the law, without resort to coercion, but through indirect
enforcement of the relevant social institute by offering incentives and
disincentives.'
AI enabled, for the first time, the removal of sex from reproduction by
enabling artificial procreation without resort to sexual intercourse. This
created a threat to the confinement of reproduction to the nuclear family.
The identification of the mechanisms crafted to combat such threats is,
therefore, of significance to the study of AI's acceptance process.
Several socio-legal taboos were traditionally used to "lure" society
toward the traditional genetic nuclear family institution and away from
alternative forms. The mechanisms most relevant to the acceptance of the
technology of AI are those based on the tie between sex and procreation.
Society traditionally controlled reproduction indirectly through defining
who is to have sexual intercourse with whom and under which
circumstances. A related assumption concerned the relationship between
marriage and sexual intercourse. For centuries it was socially accepted
that sexual intercourse should take place within the family.' Two legal
tools were utilized to secure the tie between sex and procreation. The
first is the concept of illegitimacy. The illegitimate child born to his
mother out of wedlock was considered born in disgrace. Under the
common law the illegitimate child was disqualified from certain offices,
was entitled to no support from its father, and was restricted in its rights
of inheritance.2 Through the disadvantages attached to illegitimacy the
21. See EVA FIGES, PATRIARCHAL ATIIuDES: WOMEN IN SOCIETY 38-39 (1970).
22. This legal mode of control was termed by Carl E. Schneider as the channeling function.
Through its channeling function the law, usually without resorting to coercion, creates and supports
social institutions which are thought to serve desirable goals. Schneider further explains that the
channeling of people into institutions can be done by: (1) recognizing and endorsing institutions,
thus, giving them some aura of legitimacy and permanence; (2) rewarding participation in an
institution; (3) disfavoring competing institutions; and (4) directly penalizing the non-use of the
institution. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L REV.
495, 498-99, 503-04 (1992).
23. See R. SNOWDEN Er Ai-, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL lNVSIATION 3-8 (1983).
24. See Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Statute of Limitation in Illegitimacy or Bastardy
Proceedings, 59 A.LR. 3D 685 § 2(a) (2001); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Illegitimate Children §§ 1, 7 (2000).
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law produced a disincentive for women's sexual activity outside the
confines of marriage and the traditional family. Similarly, the second
tool-the concept of adultery-had among its aims the regulation of
sexual activity into the nuclear family form. The concept of adultery,
which was traditionally a crime, was viewed as offensive to the marriage,
the community and the state. It was punished because it threatened the
stability and security of communal norms." Thus, like illegitimacy,
adultery provided a disincentive to sexual activity outside the family and
served to strengthen the institute of the nuclear genetic family.
Having defined the factors which play significant roles in the socio-
legal acceptance process, and having identified the relevant socio-legal
institute, its defense mechanisms, and its incompatibility with the
concept of the family as embedded in the technology, the next sections
will examine the way in which these factors played out in AI's long
struggle for socio-legal acceptance.
II. THE EARLY DAYS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
The technology of Al did not originate with a lone inventor
desperately tearing his hair out in a disorderly laboratory. Nor was it
invented by a corporation which-through a large investment of time and
money-produced and aggressively marketed the technology in order to
attain widespread use. The technology of Al seems to have appeared
over the years in different parts of the world while failing to achieve at
any point of time the aura of a technological innovation.
Contrary to common belief, the first reports of Al appeared long
before the twentieth-century, thereby indicating the potency of the
struggle between technological innovation, social norms, and legal
inhibitions. Hints at the possibility of pregnancy, unrelated to either the
deed of God or the act of sexual intercourse, appeared as early as the
second century in the writings of the Talmud, where the pregnancy of a
virgin through accidental insemination in bathwater was discussed.26
Later on in the thirteenth century, Rabbi Peretz Ben Elijah of Corbeil
bade women to beware of lying on linen on which any man other than
their husband had lain, lest they become pregnant and risk conceiving a
25. See LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATIONS: SENTIMENTALITY AND
NINETEENTH CENTURY LEGAL STORIES OF ADULTERY 22-23 (1998).
26. Samson Kardimon, Art4ificial Insemination in the Talmud, 2 HAROFE HAIVRi 162, 163-66
(1942).
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child of unknown origin2 These references did not discuss conception
through artificial means; they merely pointed to the possibility of
accidental conception, unrelated to intercourse or to an act of God.
The earliest source that mentioned the accomplishment of conception
through technological means (perhaps more precisely through an
intentional human act) involved the insemination of animals. The first
was an Arabian source from the fourteenth-century, describing the
insemination of a mare in heat with the sperm of a renowned breeding
stallion. 8 This event remained, however, within the confines of an
unsubstantiated tale.
The first substantiated procedure was performed in 1777 by an Italian
physiologist.2 This account is not only the first documented procedure of
AI but is also a record of the social inhibitions accompanying the
diffusion process of the technology from its very early days. Lazzaro
Spallanzani, who was a priest of Modena and professor at the University
of Pavia, successfully artificially inseminated frogs, toads, and finally a
dog. At the time, Spallanzani's accomplishments created quite a stir in
the scientific world." Yet, Spallanzani never experimented with humans.
Views varied as to the precise source of his reluctance to do so. Some
argued that as a priest and professor at the University of Pavia he would
have been dismissed on religious grounds. Others claimed that his own
personal religious beliefs or the prevailing religious sentiments of the
time prevented him from proceeding."
Despite the inhibitory influence of prevalent societal values and norms
on the application of the procedure to humans, the first reports of human
AI followed closely. The exact date when this feat was accomplished is
uncertain. Most accounts point to the performance of human Al by the
English physician, Dr. John Hunter, some time between 1776-1799.32
The report of Dr. Hunter's accomplishment demonstrates the influence of
inhibiting social norms on the nature of the technological procedure. Dr.
Hunter himself apparently did not perform the procedure. Instead, the
27. See A.M.C.M. SCHELLEN, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IN THE HuMAN 8-9 (1957).
28. See HERMANN ROHLEDER, TEST TUBE BABIES: A HISTORY OF THE ARTIFICIAL
IMPREGNATION OF HUMAN BEINGS 35-37 (1934).
29. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 11.
30. See ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 37-40; SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 11-12.
31. See ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 40; SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 12.
32. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 13; Charles E. Rice, A.LD.-An Heir of Controversy, 34
NOTRE DAME L REV. 510,511 (1959).
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husband was provided with a syringe, instructed to warm it and fill it
with semen immediately after intercourse. He was then told to inject it
into his wife's vagina immediately following intercourse while it was
still in the proper state for receiving the semen. The procedure was
successful and the woman became pregnant.33
Subsequently, all nineteenth-century accounts of Al in humans
involved the insemination of married women by their husband's sperm.
Although at times the physician reportedly executed the procedure,34 at
other instances the husband executed at least part of the procedure. One
account reported that the physician guided with his finger a rubber tube
into the cervical canal of the wife but let the husband inject the semen
himself The effort made by some of the physicians to preserve
intimacy by involving the husband in the procedure underscores the
uneasiness with which the procedure was received by both physicians
and patients. Moreover, the insistence on involving the husband in the
artificial procedure points to the reluctance to sever the tie between sex
and procreation that was strongly intertwined with the institute of the
nuclear family. The connection between sex and procreation was
apparently so deeply embedded in social morality that there was a need
to purposefully insert an element of sex into the artificial procedure.
Social norms related to the institute of the nuclear family, thus,
influenced the procedural application of the technology.
Some diffusion of Al occurred throughout the nineteenth century, but
only as an experimental procedure. Greater diffusion was inhibited by
the social norm linking sex and procreation and by Victorian nonns
guarding the modesty of the female body. The Victorian era of the
nineteenth-century is famously known for its sexual conservatism.36 This
conservatism was extended to the relationship between women and their
physicians. In the Victorian era, middle and upper class women often
declined to consult physicians for gynecological problems except in
extreme cases. Accounts describe the difficulty of attaining women's
33. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 13.
34. This was the case with Girault who was known to have performed the first "scientific"
experimentation in Al. Girault claimed to have achieved successful conception eight times. Id. at
14-15.
35. This was the case of Gigon Sr. a surgeon of Angouleme. Id. at 15.
36. See 2 FREDERICK MARRYAT, A DIARY IN AMERICA WITH REMARKS ON ITS INSTITUTIONS
244-47 (1839) quoted in Carl N. Degler, What Ought to Be and What Was: Women's Sexuality in
the Nineteenth-Century, in WOMEN AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL READINGS 192, 192
(Judith Wazer Leavitt, ed., 1999).
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medical history due to their embarrassment. 7 And furthermore, even
after the prejudice among physicians against obstetric and similar
occupations was finally overcome in the mid-eighteenth-century, they
literally had to operate in the dark. In order to avoid charges of
impropriety, lights were dim during the examination, the woman was
fully clothed and a sheet was thrown over her. The physician was obliged
to operate by touch only, his hand groping under the sheet.3"
Social norms acted to inhibit the diffusion of the technology not only
among those seeking to use it but also among the most progressive
members of the medical profession who sought to apply it. Vivid
evidence of the constraints that prevailed at the time is illustrated by the
personal story of Dr. Marion Sims. Dr. Sims was known as the "father of
modem gynecology"39 and performed the first successful human AI in
the United States.4" Dr. Sims discussed AI in his 1866 publication,
Clinical Notes on Uterine Surgery. The fact that he dared to experiment
at all in such forbidden territory and to publish his findings aroused some
of his readers to shocked indignation. Some of his critics were especially
appalled by his account of the way he, at times, visited sterile married
couples in their bedroom where he applied different measures to
overcome conception problems. The Medical Times and Gazette of
London commented:
We can but express an unfeigned regret that Dr. Marion Sims has
thought proper to found an odious style of practice on such
methods. If such practices were to be considered the business of the
physician there are a good many of us who would quit Physic for
some other calling that would let us keep our sense of decency and
self respect. Better let ancient families become extinct than keep up
the succession by such means.41
37. See Regina Morantz, The Lady and Her Physician, in CLIo's CONSCIOUSNESS RAISED: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF WOMEN 38, 48 (Mary S. Hartman & Lois Banner eds., Octagon
Books 1976) (1974).
38. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 56-59 (1980); SEALE HARRIS, WOMAN'S SURGEON: THE LIFE STORY
OF J. MARION SIMS xviii (1950).
39. HARRIS, supra note 38, at xvii.
40. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 14; Rice, supra note 32, at 511.
41. HARRIS, supra note 38, at 246-48.
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Dr. Sims was said to have later abandoned the practice of AI because he
found it to be immoral.42
Inhibiting social norms restricted the diffusion of the technology not
only by limiting the practice of Al by medical practitioners but also by
restricting its very discussion within these circles. A thesis on the topic,
which was rejected by the Faculty of Medicine in Paris, tried to explain
the scarcity of medical writing on the topic. Three reasons were given:
(1) AI sometimes caused very serious complications which brought the
practice to disrepute; (2) this method was highly repugnant to the couple;
and (3) religious and moral obligations.43
Although inhibiting social norms and not their legal manifestation
restricted the diffusion of the technology during the nineteenth-century,
the prevailing social attitudes were reflected in 1883 in the first trial
involving AI, which took place in Bordeaux. This very first legal
discussion of AI reflected the prevailing social sentiments through a
strong form of technological visibility. At trial, the physician who
performed the procedure both lost the suit against one of his patients for
refusing to pay a fee, and in a strongly worded indictment was ordered
by the Tribunal of Bordeaux to pay costs and damages. The court's
judgment was affected by the physician's generally unprofessional
conduct.'
At the same time, the result was obviously related to the Tribunal of
Bordeaux's sentiments toward the procedure. It stated, "Al constitutes an
interference between man and wife by resorting to the use of artificial
means contrary to the laws of nature and if abused, amounts to a true
social danger."45 The court's judgment was characterized by a strong
form of technological visibility. This was manifested by the attention
paid to a central feature of the technology-its artificial nature. The
technological visibility evidenced in the legal debate reflected the
arguments raised against the procedure in the social debate. In its
disapproval of the interference in the sexual relations between man and
42. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 16; Rice, supra note 32, at 511.
43. See WILLIAM KEVIN GLOVER, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AMONG HUMAN BEINGS:
MEDICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL ASPECTS 7-9 (1948).
44. The Tribunal of Bourdeaux was apparently enraged by the physician's procurement of
patients through a newspaper ad; the exorbitant fee demanded; and the physician's temerity of
accusing the wife of having an abortion after the procedure failed and apparently resulted in an
internal disease. SCHELLEN, supra note 26, at 286-87.
45. Id. at 286.
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wife, the Tribunal of Bordeaux re-affirmed the import of the tie between
sex and procreation.
Apparently this case caused quite a stir. It resulted in the appointment
of a committee by the Societe de Medicine Legale to inquire into the
issue of Al.4 6 The committee concluded in its report that the court's
declaration that AI is a social danger and conflicts with the laws of
nature was not defensible.47 However, it also stated that Al should be
applied only if the couple requests it-the physician should not suggest it
of his own volition.48 The medical faculty of the University of Paris,
which in 1885 rejected a dissertation on the topic, evidently did not
follow this pragmatic approach.49 To add to the general socio-legal
disapproval, toward the end of the nineteenth century the first formal
religious proclamation on the subject of Al was made. A Catholic ruling
in 1877 expressly condemned AI to be immoral and prohibited its
consideration. 0
Despite the inhospitable atmosphere, there was an increase in the
diffusion of the technology during the last thirty years of the nineteenth-
century. This was apparently related to a certain relaxation of the social
norm tying sex and procreation, which was caused by the exercise of
birth control. The end of the nineteenth-century saw accounts from other
European countries reporting instances of Al. 5" At the same time, many
sources report that as the nineteenth-century progressed, women
expanded their autonomy within the family. This conclusion was based
on the increase in the number of single women and divorcees, but
particularly on the decline in fertility rates.52 The number of children
over the age of five per 1000 women went down from 1342 in 1810 to
46. Id. at287.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. Id.
49. ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 156-57.
50. See Alfred Koemer, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. REV.
484,489(1948).
51. See SCtlELLEN, supra note 27, at 17-18.
52. See DEGLER, supra note 38, at 144-77; Daniel Scott Smith, Family Limitation; Sexual Control
and Domestic Feminism in Victorian America, in CLIo'S CONSCIOUSNESS RAISED: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THlE HISTORY OF WOMEN, supra note 37, at 119; Carroll Smith-Rosenberg &
Charles E. Rosenberg, The Female Animal: Medical and Biological Views of Woman and Her Role
in Nineteenth-Century America, in WOMEN AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL READINGS,
supra note 36, at 111, 115.
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six hundred sixty-six by 1900.13 Women began to see the restriction of
family size as a necessity to the preservation of health, status, economic
security and individual autonomy." Furthermore, they began to see the
pain and sometimes lingering incapacity associated with childbirth as a
condition that could be avoided." The manifestation of women's
autonomy through birth control is of great significance to the study of the
acceptance process of AI because it constitutes a parallel acceptance. At
the same time that AI operated to separate procreation from reproduction
by removing the necessity of sex from reproduction, birth control
separated the two by removing reproduction from sex. Thus, it may very
well be that this parallel development influenced the increase of reported
AI cases toward the end of the nineteenth century.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the use of birth
control was often criticized by physicians as unnatural and corrupting of
character.5 6 Furthermore, even advocates of birth control did not approve
of contraception devices. They considered "artificial" measures to be
unnatural, injurious and offensive. Those advocating birth control
proposed methods of periodic or permanent abstinence, for example
through the prediction of the wife's cycle or the avoidance of the male
climax. 7 The nature of the contraception debate and its rejection of
artificial devices was similar to the arguments raised against AL.
In addition, European publications of this time period reveal a
significant inhibiting influence of societal norms on the technological
procedure. None of the European publications referred to use of semen
which was not the husband's. Thus, one can presume that these
publications concerned inseminations with the husband's semen, known
as AII. 5" Although it is possible that some attempts were made with a
donor's sperm, known as AID, it is unlikely that any physician using the
method would have dared to make it public in the prevailing climate.59
Resort to AID would have enabled procreation where the fault lay
53. WILSON H. GRABILL ET AL., THE FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 14 (1958). Note that this
data applies only to white children.
54. See Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 115.
55. Seeid. at 118-19.
56. Seeid. at 119-20.
57. See Linda Gordon, Voluntary Motherhood: The Beginnings of Feminist Binh Control Ideas in
the United States, in WOMEN AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL READINGS, supra note 36, at
254-56.
58. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 17-18.
59. See GLOVER, supra note 43, at 9.
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principally with the male generally in the form of deficient sperm.
However, during the nineteenth-century medical opinion emphasized that
it was the wife's constitution and reproductive capacity and not the
husband's which was pertinent.6 This attitude became evident from later
writings which mentioned that some men requested the procedure but
were reluctant to prove that the infertility was their own.6" One medical
commentator summarized the state of the affairs which apparently
persisted, although perhaps with lesser vigor, to the end of the 1930s:
It is very unfair and extremely unscientific to subject the female to
all manner of investigation and even operative procedure, while the
male complacently stands by satisfied with the belief that he is not
at fault. In our modem era the woman has, through a process of
change and development, come into her own. First, social, then
political equality have served to loosen the fetters which bound her
to inferiority. Why not, then, grant her equality in the noblest field
of all-that of sexual relationship sanctified by marriage and the
glory of motherhood? Let us examine the man also.62
It is apparent that AIR was executed even when the sperm of the
husband was unlikely to produce conception.' Use of AI for this broader
range of conditions necessarily lowered the rate of success, thereby
demonstrating the ability of moral norms to affect the technical
functionality of the innovation.
The struggle of the technology of AI in the twentieth century was
launched with a strange case involving AIH, which represents an initial
effort to apply traditional family law doctrine to an incompatible
technology. The case proceeded through the German court system during
the first decade of the twentieth-century. The wife in that case claimed
that she conceived by using a candle to insert the seminal fluid she found
in the bed of her impotent husband. This was done without the consent of
her husband. The husband renounced the child and the issue of the
legitimacy of the child was raised. The courts rejected the husband's
claim of illegitimacy. The Reichgericht at Leipzig (the German highest
court of appeals) stressed the pertinent difference between normal
60. See Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 121-22.
61. See Robert L Dickinson, Artificial Impregnation: Essays in Tubal Insemination, 1 AM. J.
OBsTECS & GYNECOLOGY 255,259 (1920).
62. Joseph Cohen, Sterility, 83 NEw ORLEANS MED. SURGICAL J. 401,401 (1930).
63. See Dickinson, supra note 61, at 260.
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intercourse and this act. However, a final verdict was never proclaimed.' 4
It was here that the legal tool of illegitimacy was raised for the first time
in the context of AI as an argument for providing an incentive to keep
sex, and consequently procreation, within the nuclear family. It must be
noted that in this case the courts did not act to maintain the tie between
sex and procreation but enabled the separation. This decision
commenced the trend of uncertainty and conflicting judicial results
which was to accompany the technology of AI for many years to come.
The first publication that mentioned AID appeared in the Medical
World in 1909.6 The circumstances and storm enveloping the first
publicized AID procedure reflect the continued effect of inhibitory moral
norms, in particular where use of the sperm of another man infringed
upon the notion of a nuclear genetic family. The publication reported an
1848 case in Philadelphia involving a forty-one year old merchant and
his wife who remained childless. The physician in charge of the
procedure determined that there was no sperm in the husband's semen. It
was then decided that the wife would be anaesthetized, semen would be
collected from the best looking member of the medical school class and
that semen would be introduced into her uterus. Neither the merchant nor
his wife knew what was done. The physician confided in the merchant
after the fact. The merchant was delighted but arranged for his wife to
remain in ignorance. And, so the publication told, the wife became
pregnant and gave birth to a son who resembled not the student but the
merchant.66 The publication evoked intense criticism from the readers of
Medical World. Reactions included disbelief and shock at the immorality
of the procedure, but also some arguments advocating the procedure's
potential to end involuntary childlessness.
67
The beginning of the twentieth-century saw an increase in the
diffusion of the technology within professional medical circles.
However, even within these circles moral norms restricted the scope of
the diffusion. In the first decade of the twentieth-century the frequency of
American medical publications concerning AI increased. A similar
growth in European medical publications began only in the second and
64. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 287-88.
65. See A.D. Hard, Artificial Impregnation, 27 MED. WORLD 163 (1909).
66. Id. at 163.
67. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 19-20; A.T. Gregoire & Robert C. Mayer, The Impregnators,
16(1) FERTILITY & STERILITY 130, 132-33 (1965).
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third decade of the century.6" Furthermore, some of the comprehensive
publications about infertility published in the first decades of the century
contained no reference to A"69 Other publications commended AI as a
thoroughly reliable and scientific procedure, worthy of consideration.70
However, some emphasized the difficulties of using the procedure in the
prevailing social climate. One such publication explained that the use of
the technology was not widespread because patients often revolted at the
idea, and refused to continue after one trial, or even preferred surgical
interventions.7' Moreover, it should be noted that this surge in medical
publications still concerned AIH and not AID.7'
Although the general controversy surrounding Al was focused upon
AIH and not the more controversial procedure of AID, a Canadian court
was obliged in 1921 to take a stand with regard to AID's legal
implications. The facts of Orford v. Orford give an insight into the
prejudices and secrecy which enveloped the uncommon practice of AI in
its early days. Orford demonstrates the influence of moral norms on the
technological procedure itself, the extent of technological visibility
prevalent in early legal cases dealing with AI, the role of conflicting
technological frames of meaning and the result of the application of
traditional family law doctrine to a value-incompatible technology.
Orford concerned a newly married wife who was unable to have
intercourse with her husband due to great pain caused by her retroflexed
uterus.73 While her husband returned to Canada she remained in London
seeking medical advice. She was told that a possible cure would be
through bearing a child and that this might be done artificially. Hence,
the wife decided to proceed with the help of a friend, Hodgkison, who
agreed to act as the donor.74 A cloud of secrecy shrouded the procedure.
It took place not at a physician's office but at Hodgkison's apartment. It
was performed by a physician unknown to the patient and furthermore,
was executed while she was under anesthesia.75
68. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 20-22.
69. See generally Charles Gardner Child, Sterility and Conception (1922).
70. See, eg., Frank E. Abbett, Some Observations on Artificial Impregnation, 26 INDIANAPOLIS
MED. J. 183, 189 (1923).
71. See Dickinson, supra note 61, at 260.
72. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 20-21.
73. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.LR. 251,252 (Ont. 1921).
74. Id. at 252-53.
75. See id. at 254. Interestingly, despite the secrecy enveloping the procedure the name of the
donor-Hodgkinson-and the wife's maiden name were put on the birth certificate.
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The detailed description in the Orford judicial opinion of the
technological procedure itself and of the preparations that preceded it
highlights the technological visibility of the debate in this early legal
controversy. In addition, anesthesia was not a necessary component of
this simple, unpainful procedure. Similar to the effort to involve the
husband in the procedure, the resort to anesthesia demonstrates that the
relation between sex and procreation was not only an external legal
mechanism but was also deeply embedded in social morality. Rendering
the wife unconscious served both the purpose of controlling her sexuality
while another men's sperm was injected and of sparing her from fully
facing the artificiality of the act. Thus again, moral inhibitions affected
changes in the technological procedure.
Subsequently, the wife was rejected by her husband upon her return to
Canada and filed suit for alimony. The husband raised adultery as a
defense.76 The Orford court repeatedly stressed its disbelief in the wife's
story that the child was consummated through the procedure of AI. It
believed instead that the child was conceived through sexual intercourse
with Hodgkinson." The court did not state any skepticism with regard to
the feasibility of the procedure. Thus, it is hard to determine whether its
incredulity was a result of scientific doubts, the rarity of such practice, or
concerns with the wife's credibility.
One can find in the judgment the first appearance of the frames of
meaning which accompany the technology of AI throughout its history.
The wife repeatedly asserted that Al was a cure for her disability while
the court was reluctant to accept this frame of meaning. In the court's
own words, "She constantly spoke of it as a 'medical cure' for her
affliction. There was not, of course, anything 'medical' about it."78
Although not expressly stated, the court seemed to view the wife's act as
a matter of choice and not as a cure for a medical condition. The discord
between these two frames of meaning may provide at least a partial
explanation to the court's disbelief.
Nevertheless, the Orford court chose not to hinge its judgment on the
veracity of the plaintiffs version but to fully address the issue of AI. It
held that the essence of adultery is not in the moral turpitude of the act of
sexual intercourse but in the voluntary surrender to another person of
76. Id. at 252.
77. Id. at 254-55.
78. Id. at 254.
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one's reproductive powers.79 It further stated that to say that it is not
adultery for a woman living with her husband to produce by artificial
insemination a child of a man other than her husband would be a
"monstrous conclusion."80
The judicial debate, thus, took a strong form of technological visibility
thereby focusing on the technological act and its commonality with the
natural act of intercourse. It did not expressly acknowledge the
underlying social implication of enabling procreation without resort to
sexual intercourse within the family. The court-while focusing on the
technology-continued to apply its indirect tools of control to silently
combat the underlying social implications to the value of the family. The
indirect tool applied was the traditional doctrine of adultery, which was
created to address this type of social threat. The court thereby refused to
recognize that the tie between sex and procreation was already untied by
the new technology in a way which made the application of this doctrine
irrelevant to the debate.
Hence, at least 140 years after the invention of AI, the innovation was
practically unused and when experimented with was enveloped by a
cloud of secrecy. Limited efforts to use it encountered intense moral
condemnation stemming mainly from the traditional tie between sex and
procreation. Moral inhibition typically prevented AI's use altogether. But
furthermore, even where such use was practiced, moral inhibition caused
changes in the technological procedure. Interestingly, the moral force of
the opposition to AI (both Au and AD) was practically unrelated to
express religious or legal pronouncements. Moral condemnation resulted
from years of social control and was apparently deeply embedded in the
social norms. The few legal cases that dealt with AI were characterized
by a strong form of technological visibility. The technological visibility
resulted in a focus on the nature of the technological procedure but was
not accompanied by an express recognition of the effects on the family
unit. This issue was dealt with indirectly through the concepts of adultery
and illegitimacy. These traditional family law doctrines, although driven
by a concept of the family institute which was incompatible with the one
embedded in the technology, focused on the technology and not on the
inherent incompatibility between the two conceptions of the institute of
the family.
79. Id. at 258
80. Id.
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III. FROM MORAL CONDEMNATION TO POPULAR PRACTICE
A. The Emergence of Popular Practice in a Volatile Climate
The shift in the diffusion of the technology of AI from clinical to
popular use took place gradually over two decades-the 1930s and the
1940s. During this period, the use of AI underwent two transformations.
First, there was a shift in the 1930's from clinical to limited public use.
Second, there was a shift in the 1940's to popular use.
The exact extent in which AI was used in the 1930s is unclear. In
1934, one medical source intent on lifting Al from its god-forsaken place
in the history of medicine wrote:
Although this operation is so easy that it can be carried out by
practically every physician, the medical profession generally,
despite a number of important exceptions, is almost as ignorant of it
as the laity who, by and large, do not even suspect the existence of
such a method. For various reasons, in which moral prudishness
plays a large part, this procedure is rarely carried out upon sterile
women and never taught at the universities."
Nevertheless, another source, relying on a semi-statistical survey,
reported in the same year a somewhat different picture indicating that Al
was known to the public. The results of the survey, completed by two
hundred specialists, pointed out that fifty-six of the physicians surveyed
received requests for AID. The physicians reported that most of the
requests came in the last ten years, particularly in the last three or four.
On this basis, the writers estimated that there were 1000-3000 requests
per year for AID and that perhaps fifty to a hundred and fifty babies
conceived using AID were born per year.82 Moreover, an additional
prominent medical source reported that AI attracted quite a little
81. ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at XVI-XVII.
82. J. Caldwell, Babies by Scientific Selection, SCI. AM. (n.s.) 124, 124 (1934). It must be noted
that the survey included physicians who were considered to be more likely to receive these requests.
Most were specialists listed in American Physicians and Surgeons and several had a national
reputation for their knowledge of sterility and its treatment.
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attention owing to the success of its practice. 3 However, both sources
concluded that the practice of Al was not widespread.84
A significant increase in popular press articles discussing AI during
the 1930s supports the conclusion that public awareness of AI was
growing.8" Nevertheless, the reports published in the popular press were
not limited to informative accounts of the procedure, but included
intimidating references to the possible eugenic effects of the technology
and potential legal difficulties.86 Furthermore, Aldous Huxley's famous
book Brave New World, which was published in 1932, portrayed a
terrifying picture of a world based on the efficiencies of artificial
reproduction. In Huxley's world, pregnancies were achieved artificially
through the external fertilization of a sperm and an ovum into embryos
which were then developed in an incubator. This method enabled the
maintenance of a world which was based on a eugenic ideology. People
were created and bred into classified groups. Each group designated into
a specific role: some designated to lead and some to occupy menial
jobs.87 It thus seems that although AI was reaching public consciousness
and the exposure increased the use of the procedure, the publicity was
also accompanied by negative intonations stressing chilling potential
aspects of the procedure.
The publicity itself stemmed from changing public attitudes toward
the technology. This change was related to the influence on social norms
of a parallel social transformation-the birth control revolution and in
particular to the effect of another medical artifact-the condom. Fertility
rates continued to decline in the twentieth-century. Birth rates in the
United States declined from about thirty births per 1000 women per year
83. Frances I. Seymour & Alfred Koemer, Medicolegal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 107 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1531, 1531 (1936).
84. This conclusion was attached as an editor's comment to the Scientific American Article.
Caldwell, supra note 82.
85. See, eg., Ghost Fathers: Children Provided for the Childless, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1934, at
16; Proxy Fathers, TIME, Sept. 26, 1938, at 28. Furthermore, methodological considerations support
the accuracy of the second report, which was published in the Scientific American, against the first
account written by Dr. Rohleder. The first report by Dr. Rohleder was, in large part, a backward
looking project, surveying the medical literature, which reported use of Al. His estimate did not
exceed a couple of dozen cases in history. The Scientific American report on the other hand,
employed a "semi statistical" method surveying present practice.
86. See, e.g., Anthony M. Turano, Paternity by Proxy, 43 AM. MERCURY 418, at 423 (1938);
When is Adultery?, 44 AM. MERCURY 239 (1938)
87. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD 1-18 (Harper Perennial 1998) (1932).
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in 1909 to 18.4 births per 1000 women per year in 1933." 8 Birth rates
declined despite encouraging factors such as increased sexual activity
(urbanism enabled choosing an attractive partner), better health, earlier
marriage, and safer childbirth. This indicated increased birth control
efforts by married couples.89 The increase in the use of birth control was
related to the birth control movement led by Margaret Sanger. Sanger
insisted that women's sexual liberation and economic independence
depended upon the availability of safe, inexpensive and effective birth
control.9" Birth control became a mass market item in the 1930s.
Commercial enterprises launched a successful campaign to persuade
people to replace natural methods with commercial devices. Importantly,
condom use increased dramatically, and became second to interrupted
intercourse as the most popular method of birth control.9' As discussed
above, many of the objections to AI centered upon the artificiality of
what was traditionally a natural act. Thus, in addition to the influence of
increased women's autonomy and the separation between sex and
procreation, the birth control movement contributed to the acceptance of
AI through its introduction of artificial elements in the sexual arena.
The medical practitioners whose support was of extreme significance
to the diffusion of the medical technology of Al, did not yet mobilize as
a group to promote the technology. The physicians' attitudes were
evidently affected by the changes in the general public's attitude. The
change in the physicians' attitudes is reflected in the increased number of
medical publications discussing Al. However, the position of the medical
profession toward AI in general and AID in particular was mixed.
The semi-statistical survey portrayed this mixed position. 92 Fifteen of
the fifty-six physicians who received requests for AID were not
interested or objected to the practice. Eighteen of the fifty-six who
received requests said that they performed AID. Twenty-two of the
physicians surveyed said they turned applicants away for the following
88. GRABILL, supra note 53, at 25-26. It should be acknowledged that the Depression had an
effect on the decrease in birth rates; although birth rates started rising in 1940, they reached at most
25 births per 1000 women in 1956 at the height of the baby boom.
89. See SUSAN HOUSEHOLDER VAN HORN, WOMEN, WORK AND FERTILITY, 1900-1986, at 32-45
(1988); SAMUEL RAYNOR MEAKER, HUMAN STERILITY 221-23 (1934).
90. Andrea Tone, Contraceptive Consumers: Gender and the Political Economy of Birth Control
in the 1930s, in WOMEN AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL READINGS, supra note 36, at 306,
310-11.
91. Id. at 306-09.
92- Caldwell, supra note 82, at 150-51.
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reasons: (1) fear of being involved in subsequent legal proceedings; (2)
anxiety that the husband might later change his mind; (3) the patient did
not have her husband's consent; or (4) a belief that the public was not
ready to sanction it. Most of the physicians, however, had no particular
objections to the practice.93
Some practitioners, even among those involved in the execution of the
procedure, exhibited extreme caution. One prominent medical
professional in the field stated that AI should be treated only as an
extreme measure and should not be repeated for a second child unless the
first child was weak, sickly, or had died 4 Furthermore, he described the
attitude of his peers and the couples involved in the procedure to be
repugnance and even disgust. He believed these attitudes were related to
religious views, the belief that AI is unnatural, and people's perception
of AI as running counter to medical ethics and to the morality of the
couple.95 As for AID, the physician reported there are very few AID
cases known to him personally or through the literature. He believed that
a physician should execute such a procedure only in exceptional
circumstances.96 Furthermore, he wrote that most other physicians who
discussed the topic rejected AID altogether.97
At the same time, physicians involved in the treatment of infertility
repeatedly emphasized that a diagnostic study of sterility in the couple
must deal with the husband no less than with the wife. They expressly
criticized the male reluctance to submit to infertility examination." The
medical insistence on the examination of the male brought into light a
major reason for infertility which could be resolved by AD-deficiency
in the sperm. Thus, despite the resistance among the medical profession
and the general public, medical emphasis on the male in infertility testing
increased the potential for AlD practice.
A review of the conditions considered necessary for the procedure
reveals that it was not only moral societal norms and legal uncertainty
which held the practice back. It was technology itself, or more
93. Id.
94. ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 108-09.
95. Id. at 139.
96. ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 165-80.
97. Id. at 170. Other medical sources offered only cautious support for the procedure. See
MEAKER, supra note 89, at 214; Grant S. Beardsley, Artificial Cross Insemination, 48 W. J.
SURGERY OBSTETICS & GYNECOLOGY 94, 97-98 (1940); Editorial, Artificial Insemination and
Illegitimacy, 112 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1832 (1939).
98. See, eg., MEAKER, supra note 89, at 80-82.
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specifically the absence of scientific knowledge, which inhibited
acceptance through the creation of intimidating treatment requirements.
Although practical methods for determining the accurate time of
ovulation were introduced in the 1930s, they were incorporated into the
practice of AI only gradually.99 During the 1930s, some medical
practitioners still believed that a woman must be sexually aroused in
order to facilitate the upward movement of the sperm and produce the
alkaline secretion of the cervix necessary for the viability of the sperm.
They, thus, held the view that intercourse must precede Al. The debate
with regard to the value of intercourse before the execution of AI in
order to produce an orgasm and increase the likelihood of ovulation
apparently persisted into the 1940s.'0° Although this requirement was
rationalized in scientific terms, it evidently manifested uneasiness with
the artificial quality of the procedure. It resulted in an effort to achieve
artificial procreation in conditions that resemble conception through
sexual intercourse. Some couples were reluctant for this reason to use Al
because it required the physician to come into the couple's bedroom right
after intercourse to perform the procedure.'' Thus, a loop was created.
Moral norms encouraged the restructuring of technology to maintain the
illusion of the inseparability of sex and procreation, and the restructured
procedure reinforced the prevailing moral inhibitions.
By the 1940s another qualitative change in the diffusion of AI took
place with a shift from limited to popular use. The change was evidently
related to the great influx of popular press reports on the topic, which led
an increasing number of couples to ask their physician about the
possibility of having a "test-tube" baby.1
0 2
A study performed in 1941 demonstrated a significant increase in the
use of Al. The study found that about 9,500 American women had
achieved at least one pregnancy by AL. Moreover, it was reported that
99. See MICHAEL J. O'DOWD & ELLIOT E. PHILIPP, THE HISTORY OF OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 259 (2000); William H. Cary, Experience with Artificial Impregnation in Treating
Sterility: Report of Thirty-Five Cases, 114 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2183, 2184 (1940).
100. ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 50-59; Frank E. Abbett, Some Observations on Artificial
Impregnation, 26 INDIANAPOLIS MED. J. 183, 185 (1923); Alan F. Guttmacher, The Role ofArtificial
Insemination in the Treatment of Human Sterility, 19 BULL. N. Y. ACAD. MED. 573, 585 (1943).
101. See ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 116-17; Abbett, supra note 100.
102. See, e.g., J.P. Greenhill, Artificial Insemination: Its Medicolegal Implications, in
MEDICOLEGAL PROBLEMS 43, 50 (Samuel A. Levinson ed., 1949).
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about a third of the women were inseminated by the sperm of a donor. 3
This study was frequently attacked for its methodology, and its findings,
which contradicted all former accounts, were questioned.' 4
However, whether such doubts were justified, this survey was
important because it was the first large survey conducted. The survey
included a group of 30,000 physicians.0 5 It is quite possible, therefore,
that had a study of this scope been conducted in the 1930s, or even
earlier, it would have discovered that use of Al was far more extensive
than portrayed at the time. It may very well be that moral inhibitions
prevented researchers from executing the type of large statistical study
that was performed in 1941. It is possible that before the 1940s no
researcher felt comfortable piercing the veil of secrecy so abruptly by
sending thousands of questionnaires around the medical community.
What can explain the shift from limited public use to popular use and
to widespread publicity of the practice? One should acknowledge the
possibility that the shift was more gradual than portrayed through the
available statistical data. Even so, it is important to consider additional
factors that entered the picture.
One such factor is related to the technological arena-the medical
conditions to which the procedure was applied in the 1940s. The
emphasis on male causes for infertility and the use of AID to resolve
these cases increased the use of the procedure. AID was now much more
frequently used and was applied in cases where the husband was infertile
or when use of the husband's sperm could result in problem pregnancies
or the birth of an ill child." 6 Nevertheless, the increase in the number of
medical conditions to which Al was applied can serve only as a partial
explanation for the shift to popular use. It does not explain the source of
the public's increased willingness to accept this controversial procedure.
103. See Frances L. Seymour & Alfred Koemer, Artificial Insemination: Present Status in the
United States as Shown by a Recent Survey, 116 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2747,2747 (1941).
104. See generally, Claire E. Folsome, The Status of Artficial Insemination: A Critical Review,
45 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 915 (1943); Guttmacher, supra note 100, at 577-79.
105. Former accounts surveyed much smaller groups. Robleder's report was limited to a literary
survey and the Scientific American report survey encompassed only 200 physicians. Moreover, as
discussed earlier, since the 1930s there was a trend toward increased acceptance of Al. This study
was conducted in 1941 and the figures reported in subsequent studies did not contradict these
numbers.
106. Cases mentioned were (1) the complete absence of sperm; (2) grossly defective sperm; (3)
the likelihood of inheriting a genetic disease; and (4) Rh incompatibility. See Greenhill, supra note
102, at 46-47; Abel Stuart, The Present Status of Artificial Insemination, 85 INT'L ABSTRACTS
SURGERY 521, 521-22 (1947).
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The most plausible explanation for the shift to popular use is related to
the effect of World War II on women's role in society combined with
further technological advances in the parallel birth control front. The
War brought with it a transformation in the autonomy of women. During
the War, the number of women in the work force increased by fifty
percent.'°7 Furthermore, the necessities of the War enabled many married
women to enter the labor market for the first time."0 8 In 1940, married
women were barely a third of the work force while by 1950, despite the
end of World War 11, they still made up fifty-two percent of that group1
0 9
Although people generally disapproved of women participating in the
workforce when the woman was also a care provider for children, an
increase in married women's economic autonomy affected their overall
perception of autonomy."' Furthermore, women's autonomy was
traditionally inhibited by the connection between sex and procreation. As
was pointed out earlier, this relationship had been weakening since the
nineteenth-century when women sought to control their bodies'
procreative activity through use of contraception. By 1940, a broader
range of artificial contraception devices were in use (these included
diaphragms, condoms and the antiseptic douche) in lieu of the method of
interrupted intercourse."' Thus, increase in the popular use of AI again
coincided with increased women's autonomy. This was accompanied by
a further separation of the tie between sex and procreation, this time
motivated mainly by the use of artificial devices.
Another indirect effect of the War on the diffusion of AI was to
enhance the perceived need for the technology's usage. Following the
War there was a large increase in birth rates. The baby boom, which
followed World War II, significantly affected birth rates during the
1940s and the 1950s." 2 Reports in the popular press during the 1940s
pointed to the relationship between the need for revitalization through
birth to overcome the devastation of the War and the urgency of solving
infertility problems. Al was offered as a solution. These popular reports
107. WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN-HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-70, at 135-150 (1972).
108. Id. at 144-46.
109. See id. at 174-95; DEGLER, supra note 38, at 418.
110. See CHAFE, supra note 107, at 174-95.
111. Tone, supra note 90, at 306-09.
112. The birth rate for third children doubled between 1940 and 1960 and that for fourth children
tripled. CHAFE, supra note 107, at 217. At its peak in 1957, the rate of childbirth was fifty percent
higher than in 1940. HOUSEHOLDER VAN HORN, supra note 89, at 85.
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were not without the eugenic overtones that accompanied press reports of
AI in the 1930s. One such Article reported a proposal to establish clinics
in different European cities where the wives of impotent husbands could
be artificially inseminated by the sperm of a superior man of the same
nationality."' Through its devastation, World War II increased the
pressure for curing infertility.
As the extent of the diffusion of Al and particularly AID shifted from
limited to popular use, controversies regarding the rights and duties of
the involved parties started reaching the courts. The cases, however,
remained few and far between and demonstrate the failure of the law to
provide the legitimacy and certainty that would encourage greater
diffusion of the technology.
In 1945, an unreported United States case, Hoch v. Hoch was
adjudicated on facts which were similar to those of the Canadian Orford
case.'14 The court, however, reached an opposite conclusion with regard
to AID. On the facts of the case, the court found that the wife, in fact,
committed adultery the old fashioned way and therefore granted the
husband a divorce. Nevertheless, it opined that had the wife proven that
the child was consummated through AID and not sexual intercourse, she
could not be divorced because AID does not constitute evidence for
adultery." 5
This was followed by the far more conspicuous New York case of
Strnad v. Strnad. 6 This decision dealt with the claim of the father for
visitation rights of his child, who was born through AID." 7 The court
granted the husband visitation rights."8 It held that the child was "semi-
adopted" and therefore, the husband was entitled to the same rights as
those acquired by a foster parent who has formally adopted a child, and
possibly to the rights of a natural parent."9 In addition, the court
113. See Editorial, Substitute Fathers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1943, at 87; Marie Baynon Ray, Father
Anonymous, WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION, Jan. 1945, at 20.
114. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
115. Rice, supra note 32, at 514.
116. Stmad v. Stmad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See, e.g., Paternity Rights at Issue in
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1944, § 4 (magazine), at 19.
117. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 390-391.
118. Id. at 391.
119. Id. at 391-92.
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indicated by dicta that the child was not illegitimate. However, it refused
to decide the property rights of the child or the sanctity of AID.
°20
Nevertheless, the uncertain legal status of AI rendered this decision
ineffective. The wife took the AID child to Oklahoma and refused to
permit the husband to exercise his visitation rights. An Oklahoma court
reached an opposite result from that of the New York court. It upheld the
wife's position and ruled that the child was illegitimate, was the child
only of his mother and that the husband had no visitation rights.
121
The legal debate in the Strnad case deviated from the general trend of
technological visibility, which dominated the legal discourse during that
period, and is an early example of technological invisibility. The court
did mention that the child was conceived through AI but did not focus on
the nature of the procedure itself. Instead, it focused on the resulting
family relationship under the specific circumstances. Yet, technological
invisibility was not accompanied at this stage by an awareness of the
social ramifications of the technology.
The Hoch and Strnad cases were the first legal proceedings in the
United States that addressed AI and their contradictory results served to
enhance the uncertainty with regard to the legality of the procedure and
its consequences.1 2 These cases demonstrated the tension between the
two incompatible conceptions of the family. Those advocating the
technology, and thereby the notion of procreation outside the nuclear
family, believed that sex and procreation should be separated and that the
traditional concepts of adultery and illegitimacy should not be used in
this context. On the other hand, those who objected to the technology
endorsed the notion of the nuclear family and the use of the traditional
modes of control. 2 3 The objectors were supported by the backward
120. Id. at 392.
121. Id.; Rice, supra note 32, at 517.
122. It should be noted, that the contradictory results cannot be explained on the basis of gender
discrimination designed to grant the husband a favorable legal outcome. It was not always the case
that whenever the husband requested rights in the child, the court found the child to be legitimate
and therefore granted the husband the requested rights. Nor was it always the case that whenever the
husband denied his responsibilities for the child, the court found the child to be illegitimate or the
wife to have committed adultery, thereby exonerating the husband from liability. In Strnad where the
husband sought visitation, the New York court indicated the child to be legitimate while the
Oklahoma court found him to be illegitimate. And in the Hoch case where the husband filed suit for
adultery the court refused to hold that AID constitutes adultery.
123. See, e.g., Koemer, supra note 50, at 494 (commenting on the need to separate sexuality and
procreation and arguing that Al must be distinguished from sexual intercourse because applying the
prohibition against promiscuous intercourse to Al is meaningless).
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looking nature of the common law system, that is, the precedent system's
institutional tilt against adoption of new governing principles and
abandonment of old methods of control. 4
The legislatures of several states, which at least structurally were not
backward looking, made several efforts at the end of the 1940s to install
some certainty into the legal status of AL. However, seven bills that were
introduced in four states and were intended to legitimize AID children all
failed.' This failure points to a legislative reluctance to take a stand on
an issue which at this point was still very morally controversial." 6
The only relevant law in effect in the 1940s was a directive drawn up
by the Department of Health of New York City in 1947. Section one
hundred and twelve of the Sanitary Code of New York forbade anyone
who was not a licensed physician to collect, offer for sale, sell or give
away human semen." That Code also included an applicable section
imposing upon the doctor the duty to keep confidential records of his
work on AI and to examine the donor for venereal or other relevant
diseases.' This regulation implicitly recognized the legality of AL.
The legal uncertainty did not remain hidden from the general public
and the ambiguity in the legal sphere, therefore, influenced the social
arena. The reports featured in the popular press tended to portray Al
positively, however, they did dedicate a significant part of the discussion
to the related legal problems. The reports not only discussed legal
124. In Carl Schneider's description of the channeling function he mentions efficiency as one of
its goals. Schneider explains that efficiency operates to spare people from having to invent forms of
life de novo. Schneider, supra note 22, at 506-11. However, the channeling power of the law can
operate inefficiently at times of technological upheaval. The law's channeling function bound by
existing arrangements may fail to readjust to the new reality. Thus, inertia is created which
mistakenly replaces order for efficiency. The law becomes detached from the novel state of affairs
produced by the technological change and social efficiency is replaced with internal efficiency.
125. See George P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law,
67 MICH. L REv. 127, 143 (1968) (referring to Al bills in Indiana, New York, Virginia and
Wisconsin in 1948-50). Several bills were also introduced in Minnesota in 1949. The Minnesota
bills would have made Al unlawful but would have legitimized the children. See Arthur A.
Levinson, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 4 J.
FORENsicMED. 147, 166 (1957).
126. The explanations given for these failures did not really clarify their cause. Their main theme
was that such laws were unnecessary because the rights and duties of parties involved were clear
under existing law. See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973);
Barry Stephen Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confusion-An Appraisal
of Current Medico-Legal Status, 3 HOUS. L. REv. 277,298 (1966).
127. Abner I. Weisman, The Medical Viewpoint, 7 SYRACUSE L- REV. 96, 98 (1955).
128. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 317.
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uncertainty regarding the litigated issues of adultery and legitimacy, but
also raised issues which had not yet been litigated at that point, such as
the legal status of the donor.'29
At the same time during the 1940s, despite the increasing legal
uncertainty, the attitudes of the medical profession toward Al began to
diverge from those of the general public. Physicians started undertaking
a leading role in the fight for the socio-legal acceptance of AI.
The shift in attitudes toward AI and AID in particular was manifested
in a poll conducted in 1947 by the American Society for the Study of
Sterility. The Society polled its members regarding their attitudes toward
AID. Fifty-two physicians approved of the procedure while twelve
disapproved. Of those disapproving, two disapproved on legal grounds,
two on religious grounds and four on both legal and religious grounds. 30
This manifested a significant shift from the attitudes toward AID
reported during the 1930s. One could, however, still find caution
expressed by doctors using AD as to the conditions in which it should
be utilized. Statements were made, for example, advocating careful
screening in lieu of mass usage."'
The growing support of AI by infertility experts was evidenced in
their effort to downplay the effects of the prevailing legal uncertainty.
For example, an opinion furnished by the Bureau of Legal Medicine of
the American Medical Association stated that "[n]o act is illegal unless
prohibited by some law, either written or unwritten, and society has
formed no opinion and enacted no law regarding artificial
insemination."'
By the end of the 1940s, AI had achieved growing popular use. The
causes of the growing acceptance were only loosely related to advances
in the technology itself. AID was known before this period and no
significant new application for the technology came up during this
period. Furthermore, the rate of success was not an issue in any of the
legal cases or the popular press reports. It can, therefore, be surmised that
129. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 113, at 47; Stand, TIME, May 19, 1947, at 76.
130. Alan F. Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15
OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 767,780 (1960).
131. Greenhill, supra note 102, at 50-51. See also Stuart, supra note 106, at 521; Guttmacher,
supra note 100, at 589-90.
132. Beardsley, supra note 97, at 97. Although it should be noted that other medical sources were
more cautious. One such source who spoke in a symposium held in 1945 admitted that those
involved in the procedure are presently betting on the fact that there are no legal rulings, apart from
that of the Orford case, against the procedure. See Greenhill, supra note 102, at 55-56.
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improvements in the rate of success, whether real or illusionary, were
immaterial to the acceptance of the technology.'33 The simple nature of
the procedure and the couples' desire for a baby made the exact rate of
success apparently irrelevant to their willingness to undergo the
procedure. Thus, the AI technology itself apparently did not play a major
role in the acceptance process during this period.
In sum, moral social norms, World War HI, advances in the parallel
technology of birth control, and the law were the main influences during
this period. The increasing autonomy of women, in particular as it related
to their effort to gain control over their bodies through the separation of
sex and procreation by use of artificial methods of birth control, in
combination with the historical circumstances of World War II acted to
weaken moral inhibitions regarding AL. However, the remaining force of
moral norms aimed at the maintenance of the nuclear family was
manifested through the law's indirect means of control. The law began
taking its role as a major inhibiting force in the acceptance process of AL.
This role was undertaken as the legal debate started inflicting a sense of
indeterminacy upon the social debate. The practical legislative vacuum
and the few conflicting legal cases induced uncertainty as to the legal
ramifications of the procedure. Thus, the law became the conservative
force in face of a trend of dissolution of the moral norms related to the
regulation of society into nuclear organic family social units.
Of significance to the new balance between the social norms and the
law was the novel role gradually taken upon by the medical profession.
Physicians, in particular those involved in infertility treatment, were no
longer swayed by the public opinion but began taking a leading role in
encouraging the use of AI despite the growing threat of legal uncertainty.
This mediating role, as will be seen in the next section, was of extreme
significance in the socio-legal acceptance process of AL.
133. It is hard to ascertain whether the rate of success in the use of Al changed dramatically
through the years because it depended upon the infertility conditions to which the procedure was
applied. Most sources throughout the history of AI point to a 30% rate of success for AIH and a 50-
80% rate of success for AID. See ELizABEmH NOBLE, HAVING YOUR BABY BY DONOR
INSEMINATION 100 (1987); ROHLEDER, supra note 28, at 129-30; SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 190-
203; Andree Schoysman-Deboeck et al., Results in 65 Couples, in HUMAN ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION AND SEMEN PRESERVATION 231,247 (Georges David & Wendel S. Price eds., 1980).
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B. Use in the Shadow of the Law
The 1950s were characterized by enhanced diffusion manifested by
growing public awareness and use of AL. The extended diffusion was
accompanied by contradictory legal judgments, a legislative vacuum, and
the promulgation of opinions regarding AI by different religious
authorities.
Various sources demonstrated that by the 1950s, AI was well known
to the public. The many newspaper and magazine articles published
during that decade generally reflected a positive attitude toward Al.'34 A
survey conducted in 1957 to examine women's feelings toward AI found
that both AMH and AID were considered acceptable measures and
preferable to adoption.'35 Nevertheless, the veil of secrecy that
traditionally surrounded the procedure was maintained even in this era of
increasing popular use. Unlike adopted children, AID children were not
told about the method of their conception and believed their father to be
their genetic father.'36
The changing societal attitudes toward Al were reflected most
importantly in the increase in the use of the procedure. There is no
formal statistical survey that reflects the extent of the use. Furthermore,
such statistics would have limited value due to the air of secrecy
enveloping the procedure. 37 However, several evaluations made in the
1950s estimated that 10,000 to 100,000 individuals conceived through AI
were alive in the United States. 13 In addition, one source estimated that
there were 1,000-1,200 AI children born each year in the United
134. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 229-31. See also Doctors Endorse Test-Tube Births, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1953, at 53; Alan F. Guttmacher, Test Tube Paternity, NATION, Mar. 29, 1958, at
269; Our Two Test Tube Babies, CORONET, Mar. 1956, at 66; Test-Tube Babies, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
27, 1954, at 48; Test-Tube Test Case, TIME, Dec. 27, 1954, at 52; Test-Tube Birth Hit, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1954, at 11.
135. Levinson, supra note 125, at 170-71. It must be noted, however, that the survey was not
based on statistical sampling methods and may not reflect the sentiments in the general population.
For instance, only one Catholic replied to the survey.
136. See, e.g., Our Two Test Tube Babies, supra note 134, at 69. The editors' note that
accompanied the article, which was written by an AID mother, stated that the writer's name "for
obvious reasons cannot be revealed." The writer herself further elaborated that the need for secrecy
is required because society is not ready and may never be to accept these children.
137. Rice, supra note 33, at 511.
138. William Mangin, The Sociological and Anthropological Viewpoint, 7 SYRACUSE L. REV.
106, 106 (1955); id. at 512; Test Tube Babies, supra note 134.
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States.'39 Most importantly, commentators agreed that there had been a
huge increase in AI usage since the early 1930s. 4 '
The increased public awareness and use of the technology of AI and
particularly of AID resulted in the formulation of opinions on the topic
by various religious leaders. This came in stark contradiction to the
virtual religious silence throughout the first half of the twentieth-century.
The Catholic Church ruled out the legitimacy of both AlH and AID.
Pope Pius XII commented on the topic on three occasions in 1949, 1951
and 1956.' His rejection of AIH was based on his view that it reduced
the cohabitation of married people and the conjugal act to a mere organic
function. This, the Pope commented, would convert the sanctuary of the
family into nothing more than a biological laboratory. 42 However, since
the Pope added that he did not necessarily condemn the use of certain
artificial means to facilitate the conjugal act or attain its objective, some
Catholic authorities did not think that the door had been completely
shut. 4
3
In 1948, a thirteen-member commission of the Church of England
endorsed the practice of AIH.' M As for AID, the Commission
differentiated it from adultery because the latter injures the partner, the
family and society while AID does not necessarily do so. However, it
stated that AID is a wrong despite the fact no sexual pleasure is involved.
It finally concluded that it could not condone AID because the donor
illicitly invades the marriage and the wife, despite her good intentions,
breaks her marriage vows. In 1949, the Archbishop took a stronger
stance, stating that AID is adultery because of the relation to the sexual
and reproductive organs.'45
As for the Jewish religious authorities, most Orthodox Jewish
authorities seemed to agree that AIH was impermissible except in cases
where no children are born after ten years of marriage and where it was
139. Rice, supra note 33, at 512.
140. Levinson, supra note 125, at 148.
141. Id. at 149-151.
142. Pius XII, Allocution: Artificial Insemination (Sept. 29, 1949), in 3 THE CANON LAW DIGEST:
OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AFFECTING THE CODE OF CANON LAW 1942-53, at 432-33 (T.
Lincoln Bouscaren ed., 1953); Pius XII, Allocution: Artificial Insemination Condemned (Oct. 29,
1951), in 3 THE CANON LAW DIGEST: OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AFFECTING THE CODE
OF CANON LAW 1942-53, at 434 (T. Lincoln Bouscaren ed., 1953).
143. Pius XII, supra note 142; Levinson, supra note 125, at 150.
144. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 358-59.
145. Id. at 359-60.
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impossible to have children by any other means. Moreover, this fact had
to be established by the expert opinion of two doctors and two rabbis.'46
As for AID, the practice was forbidden, but AID children were
considered legitimate if the insemination occurred by accident.
4 7
Conservative or Reform Jewish authorities either did not formulate a
position by the end of the 1950s or viewed both AIH and AID to be
permissible.'48
The official religious proclamations arrived surprisingly late in the
evolution of AL. Therefore, the proclamations did not provide the source
of the prevailing social sentiments but merely an additional reflection
thereof or at most support for existing sentiments. Although some
religious authorities vehemently opposed AID, the opposition was not as
intense as that provoked by other techno-social practices such as
abortion. As for ATH, it is apparent that most religious authorities did not
oppose its use. A mix of technological visibility and an appraisal of the
ramifications to the marital connection characterized the nature of the
religious discourse. Yet in contrast to the legal debate, technological
visibility was accompanied by a discussion of the social ramifications of
the technology. However, the acknowledgment of the social
ramifications was of a limited nature. It did not address the technological
social implication inherent in the technology, that is, the overall effects
on the traditional nuclear family of enabling procreation without sex
between the married couple. Instead, it focused on a partial picture of the
marital connection, without taking into account the AID child and the
construction of an alternative family unit.
Growing public acceptance was accompanied by lingering inhibitions,
which gained some support from proclamations made by religious
authorities. What, then, was the driving force behind the growing
acceptance of the technology of AI? One possible explanation would be
the degree of technological progress. However, although changes in the
technology may have had a certain positive influence on the societal
acceptance of AI the major technological progress of the decade was
itself restrained by socio-legal forces.
146. Levinson, supra note 125, at 154.
147. Id. at 154-55. The source of the rationale for legitimizing AID by accident is in the Talmud.
The Talmud reported that the prophet Jeremiah's daughter took a bath in the same water her father
bathed in. His semen was in the water and she was inseminated by accident and gave birth to a son,
Ben Sirah. Id.
148. Id. at 155-56.
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Understanding of women's fertility cycles and the timing of ovulation
served to eliminate the requirement that sexual arousal of the woman
immediately precede insemination. The medical literature no longer
reported the appropriate timing for insemination to immediately follow
the woman's orgasm. 49 This also removed the need to have the physician
come into the couple's bedroom right after intercourse-an awkward
part of the procedure for all involved. The effect of this was twofold.
First, it made a larger number of couples feel at ease about the procedure.
Secondly, it eradicated practical obstacles, which at times had confined
the procedure to the couple's bedroom. Execution of the procedure in the
physician's office was significant because it enhanced the medical aura
of the procedure-its "cure" aspect.
The main technological advance, however, was the discovery in 1949
of the protective action of glycerol during the freezing and thawing of the
sperm. Yet, emphasis was placed on use of the discovery for the
insemination of farm animals and not for human insemination. The
discovery of glycerol was eventually followed, only four years later, by
the discovery of a method of improving sperm preservation. This
involved utilizing glycerol and taking into account the rate of freezing,
and achieved a sixty-seven percent survival rate of sperm following three
months of storage. The method further demonstrated that sperm which
was kept motile by freezing was capable of fertilizing an egg and
preserving normal embryonic development. 5 '
These discoveries could have served as a foundation for the opening
of sperm banks. These would have enabled: concentrating several
batches of sperm from husbands with low sperm count, storing sperm
from different donors to insure availability, and storing men's sperm for
use at a later time.' Yet, despite the possibility to efficiently freeze
sperm and develop sperm banks only one sperm bank was founded in the
United States throughout the 1950s. 52
The explanations for the delay are of both a technological and socio-
legal nature. There are two technological explanations. First the
technique was incorrectly used or did not give optimal results after long
periods of storage. Secondly, that frozen storage was considered
149. See SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 126-36; Weisman, supra note 127, at 99.
150. J. IC Sherman, Research on Frozen Human Semen: Past, Present and Future, 15 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 485, 487-88 (1964).
151. Id. at 490-91.
152. Id. at 488.
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relatively expensive and inefficient for small quantities of semen, which
were infrequently used.'53
In addition, there are several explanations of a socio-legal nature.
First, AID was not sufficiently widespread, thus, demands for the
advantages of stored semen were comparatively slight. Second,
physicians were hesitant to try something new, which introduced another
non-physiological factor through the process. Third, it was felt that the
religious, legal and political obstacles inherent in AID should not be
exacerbated further through the creation of sperm banks. 54
The socio-legal explanations point to an unexpected mechanism by
which those who desired to promote the acceptance of the technology
acted to hold it back. For the sake of achieving the acceptance of the
basic AI technology those advocating the use of the technology preferred
to inhibit it from evolving further into the creation of sperm banks. In
other words, those promoting the separation of sex and procreation were
afraid to take their project further by inserting an additional artificial
factor.'55
On the legal front-uncertainty continued to prevail. Increased use
and publicity in the 1950s were accompanied by a growing number of
contradictory legal opinions. In the infamous case of Doornbos v.
Doornbos56, a declaratory judgment was issued stating that while AIH
was legal and not contradictory to public policy and good morals, this
was not the case with AID. AID, whether executed with or without the
consent of the husband, was found to be contrary to public policy and
good morals and to constitute adultery. Furthermore, the child born
through AID was considered born out of wedlock and the court
determined that the father had no rights or interests in the child. 57 The
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. This can be explained by viewing the physicians as change agents seeking to achieve a state
of dynamic equilibrium in lieu of a state of disequilibrium. A state of dynamic equilibrium takes
place when the rate of change in the social system is commensurate with the system's ability to cope
with it. The change occurs at a rate that allows the system to adapt to it. On the other hand, a state of
disequilibrium takes place when the rate of change is too rapid to permit a social system to adjust.
Thus, the physicians' efforts to prevent the opening of sperm banks can be explained as an effort to
achieve dynamic equilibrium. ROGERS, supra note 9, at 424-25.
156. 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1954).
157. Id.
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decision of the court in this case attracted widespread publicity in the lay
press and in medical journals.5 8
To add to the amalgamation of legal contradictions, a year later
another far less publicized New York case reached a different result.
Although not ruling directly on the issue of AID, the court stated that the
wife was estopped from claiming that the children were conceived
through donor insemination in order to deny the husband visitation and
custody rights when she did not raise such a claim in either the
separation or the divorce proceedings. The court found that such estoppel
was necessary to preserve the best interests of the children.5 9
The legal uncertainty in the 1950s, like the general societal debate,
focused on AID. As in the 1940s, legal cases were few and contradictory
and were again accompanied by a legislative silence. One possible
reason for the legal vacuum was the secrecy of the entire operation. 6 ' An
additional reason was the influence of the rules of evidence. Several
evidentiary rules reduced the likelihood that the issue of AID would be
litigated on its merits. First and foremost of those was the presumption of
the legitimacy of the child.' Also of significance was the rule
prohibiting husband and wife from testifying against each other on the
issue of adultery in a marital proceeding founded on this issue; the rule
disabling a spouse from testifying, without the consent of the other, to
confidential exchanges made during marriage; and the general
incompetence of a spouse to testify to the absence of consummation
during wedlock where the effect would be to show the illegitimacy of the
offspring.1
62
Thus, it is possible to discern two ways in which legal inertia was
developed. First, the law failed to adjust to the technology of AI due to
its adherence to traditional forms of control. Second, the legal procedure
inhibited discussion and clarification of issues surrounding Al.
The law exerted social control by adhering to the concepts of adultery
and legitimacy through which it sought to maintain the traditional tie
between sex and procreation. Although not uniformly, most legal cases
dealing with AI were still characterized by technological visibility. The
focus on the technological details concealed the effects on the social
158. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 125, at 153-56; Test-Tube Test Case, supra note 134.
159. Abajian v. Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178,182-83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
160. Rice, supra note 34, at 521.
161. Id. at 521.
162. Id.
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ramifications, that is, the ability to procreate without resort to sexual
intercourse within the nuclear family. The rationale underlying the legal
action was that enabling procreation outside the nuclear family unit
would disintegrate the organic units and result in disorder. However, it
was demonstrated that retaining the tie between sex and procreation
would, in fact, achieve the opposite result. Social science researchers
who conducted a survey in 1954 showed that it was not AID that broke
up family life, but the infertility and the consequent childlessness that
tended to disintegrate the family units. The study established that barren
marriages were at least twice as likely to break up as those that had
children to hold them together.' 63 Thus, the application of the traditional
control mechanisms to protect the nuclear family unit could in fact break
it up. It could also bring into the picture additional players, such as the
donor who never intended to partake a role in such a family, or could
merely increase the incidence of divorce. Thus, the legal inertia not only
inhibited progress, but also contributed to the disintegration of the family
unit-the very opposite of the result sought.
The inhibition created through the rules of evidence was the other
cause of legal inertia. The procedural aspects of the law stagnated its
evolution by preventing issues from being discussed and clarified. Here,
procedural measures-structured to protect the traditional family unit-
prevented the resolution of novel issues stemming from new technology
and in effect, as discussed above, enhanced the likelihood of reaching the
opposite result.
The public did not remain oblivious to the increasing and unresolved
legal uncertainty. The popular press consistently described the legal
uncertainty and reported new developments."6 The significant weight
given by the public to the legal situation was demonstrated by the
findings of the previously mentioned survey, which described women's
attitudes toward AI. 165 Overall, the women surveyed believed that
children born through AI should be considered legitimate if the husband
had consented to the procedure. However, at the same time, the survey
163. Herbert D. Lamson et al., Sociological and Psychological Aspects ofArtificial Insemination,
145 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1062, 1063 (1954). The authors took into account that some barren
marriages are not the result of infertility, but of an unsuccessful marriage which later leads to
divorce. Nevertheless, even after accounting for this fact, the results remained striking.
164. See, for example, the following Articles reporting on the Doornbos case: Mother Wins
Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1955, at 14; 'Test Tube' Baby Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1954, at
39; Test-Tube Babies, supra note 134; Test-Tube Test Case, supra note 134.
165. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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indicated that most women would not use AI if the courts would hold
that it would render the child illegitimate.166 Furthermore, the legal threat
prevented the issues of adultery and illegitimacy from disappearing from
the public debate. The public debate, thus, like its legal counterpart, often
took the form of technological visibility by comparing the artificial
quality of the procedure to natural conception. One writer described her
feelings as follows: "Have I committed adultery? Adultery connotes a
certain pleasure. What could be further from pleasure than lying on a
hard (the doctor calls it "firm") table two or three times a month, at $30 a
session, contemplating that white ceiling?"' 67
It is apparent that the growing acceptance of AI cannot be explained
by transformations in the technological or legal arenas. The legal sphere,
in particular, proved to be a major force inhibiting the acceptance of Al.
As it turns out, it was the medical profession that became a major
mobilizing force behind the growing acceptance of AL. It was the
medical profession that united behind Al and sought to mediate between
the restraints imposed by legal uncertainty and the use of the technology.
In the 1950s, the medical profession (or at least those engaged in
infertility treatments) finally granted its full support to the use of Al in
general and AID in particular. An opinion issued in 1955 by the
American Society for Study of Sterility evidenced this move."' The
opinion represented the views of 500 specialists in the area of sterility. It
approved AI in both its forms as a completely ethical, moral, and
desirable method of medical therapy. The opinion concluded that AI over
the years achieved "almost universally good" results for the family
unit. 69 The infertility physicians united behind the frame of meaning that
conceived of AI as a cure for infertility rather than as a matter of choice.
They believed that this cure should not be denied. In the words of one
such medical commentator: "[t]he population of this country today
includes around 1,000,000 potentially fertile women who are sterilized
by social circumstances."' 70
The physicians, faced with increasing public interest, lingering moral
and religious scruples, and no legal guidance, were forced to improvise
in a foreign field. They rightly noted that the crux of every legal question
166. Levinson, supra note 125, at 170-71.
167. Our Two Test Tube Babies, supra note 134.
168. Levinson, supra note 125, at 166.
169. Id.
170. Larnson, supra note 163, at 1062.
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with regard to AID is the status of the child with respect to its mother's
husband, institutional patterns, and ground rules that were created to
attest and bind the mother, husband, and child as a nuclear family. The
practices developed by the physicians to combat legal uncertainty
originated in thel930s171 However, as discussed below, it was only in
the 1950s that such practices were repeatedly accounted for and reported
from corresponding sources.
172
The physicians undertook two types of efforts. First were the efforts to
blur the facts in order to make it impossible for an arbiter in any
subsequent legal dispute to determine the source of the sperm from
which the child was conceived (through donor or through husband).
Second, they focused their efforts on procedures and advice that would
make future legal disputes less likely.
The physicians' efforts to conceal facts surrounding AI consisted of
several tactics. The first tactic related to a change in the technological
procedure itself. When performing AID, the physician at times chose to
inseminate the wife with a mixture of the husband's and the donor's
semen. Adding the semen of the infertile husband was known to be
medically ineffective. The physicians acknowledged that they performed
the practice for two reasons: first, in order to give the husband some hope
that the child might be his, and second, to make it impossible for a
subsequent legal inquiry to determine that the child was conceived
through AID.1
73
Genetic testing was not yet invented. The available option of paternity
blood testing was relatively inconclusive. The tests, which were based on
examining the blood type of the father and the child, enabled only the
exclusion of the potential father if the blood types did not correspond but
did not enable the identification of the donor. In addition, courts
conflicted as to the tests' admissibility and the evidentiary weight they
171. See Seymour & Koerner, supra note 83, at 1533. Dr. Koemer, who was both an attorney and
a physician practicing Al, proposed in both articles ways in which physicians could deal with the
legal hazards surrounding the procedure.
172. One can fairly assume that these practices were under-reported as part of the secrecy
enveloping the entire practice of Al. However, the number and type of reports published in the 1950s
seem to indicate a shift in the popularity of these measures.
173. Mangin, supra note 138; Test-Tube Test Case, supra note 134. A later report also
substantiated the intent to evade the law. See S.J. Behrman, Techniques ofArtificial Insemination, in
PROGRESS IN INFERTILITY 717, 721 (S.J. Behrman & Robert W. Kistner eds., 1968).
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should be accorded. 74 Thus, in the 1950s, this practice could still provide
a certain form of shield. An additional tactic involved matching the blood
type of the donor to that of the husband, making it impossible to prove
that the husband was not the father of the AID child. 7 1 And, in another
effort to maintain secrecy as to the origin of the sperm, some doctors
would falsely swear the husband to be the father and enter his name on
the birth certificate even when the sperm was a donor's. 76 Physicians
reluctant to falsely swear to the husband's paternity would send the
couple elsewhere for birth where an unknowing physician would
innocently do so."v In addition, many physicians intentionally avoided
keeping any permanent records of the AID procedure to prevent future
factual determination.
1 78
174. The discovery that blood can be classified into blood types that are inherited from the parents
was made by Karl Landsteiner in 1901. Robert E. Keith, Book Review: Probability of Inclusion in
Paternity Testing, at http:lwww.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cselnew/csr8306.htm (ast visited Feb. 3,
2002). Blood testing, however, enabled only the exclusion of someone for not being the father
because his blood type could not produce a child with the specified blood type. It was impossible to
prove paternity positively because many men belong to each blood group. SIDNEY B. SCHATKIN,
DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 90-96 (1st ed. 1944). In addition, paternity blood testing was
not quickly embraced by the courts. Some courts refused to grant blood-testing results conclusive
weight and the legislatures were generally silent on the matter. See Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442,
450-51 (Cal. Dist CL App. 1946); SCHATKIN, supra, at 124-25; Mark Edward Larson, Blood Test
Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13 J. FAM. L. 713,
731-38 (1973-74). Some changes did take place in the 1950s with the American Medical
Association's endorsement of a report, which recommended that blood testing procedures should be
adopted for medico-legal application and the promulgation of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity. These influenced courts and legislatures to grant the tests more conclusive
weight. 1 BuRR W. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 111, at 193-94 (5th ed.
1958); 2 JONES, supra, § 457, at 870; Larson, supra, at 732. Nevertheless, it was only in the 1970s
that commentators estimated that there was a unanimous and universal judicial willingness to admit
evidence of blood tests and give it strong if not conclusive evidence. Id. at 732.
175. Secret of Al, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1965, at 81. An additional possible explanation to the
practice of mixing sperm despite the increasing admissibility and weight given to blood tests may be
related to the time lag between the occurrence of legal changes and their penetration into the
consciousness of the medical profession. Medical practitioners in their efforts to promote AI may
have been unaware of the increasing futility of their actions.
176. Note, Artificial Insemination: A Parvenu Intrudes on Ancient Law, 58 YALE L.J. 457, 465
(1949) [hereinafter A Parvenu Intrudes]; Alan F. Guttmacher, The Role ofArtficial Insemination in
the Treatment of Human Sterility, 19 BULL. OF THE NEW YORK ACAD. OF MED. 573, 590.
177. See Anthony F. LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: I-Legal Aspects, I CATH. LAW. 172, 181
(1955); Koemer, supra note 50, at 494; Seymour & Koemer, supra note 83, at 1533; A Parvenu
Intrudes, supra note 176, at 465.
178. See A Parvenu Intrudes, supra note 176, at 465; Lawrence Banks, Aspects of Adoption and
Artificial Insemination, in PROGRESS IN INFERTILITY 711, 715 (S.J. Behrman & Robert W. Kistner
eds., 1968); Member, Discussion and Question Period, in SYMPOSIUM ON MEDICOLEGAL PROBLEMS
67,78 (Samuel A. Levinson ed., 1949); Secret ofAl, supra note 175, at 81.
1081
Washington Law Review
The physicians' goal was also achieved by regulating the procedure in
a way which would decrease the likelihood of future legal disputes. By
carefully selecting the candidates for the treatment, they tried to reduce
the chances of the procedure being the origin of a judicial controversy. 179
Physicians hinged the decision on conclusions regarding the emotional
makeup of the couple, the couple's adjustment to each other, the
presumable stability of their marriage, the couple's attitude toward
children, the particular reasons that have lead the couple to seek help, the
intellectual capacity of the couple, and the couple's financial situation. 8'
In addition, physicians undertook "semi-legal" functions by advising
participants in AID to draw wills in order to avoid the pitfalls of
intestacy and by executing consent agreements (including fingerprinted
ones) involving the parties to the procedure.' 8'
Consequently, it is apparent that the frame of meaning through which
many infertility physicians perceived AI technology was distinguished
from that used by society in general and by the law in particular. The
physicians' frame of meaning was transformed by their consistent
exposure to the misery of infertility and to the cure AI could bring to an
unhappy marriage. Viewing AI as a cure was also related to their role as
society's healers. Infertility physicians now perceived AIH and AID as
cures equivalent to other medical treatments. This enabled them to
mediate between the legal inertia manifested by the law's reluctance to
let go of out-dated modes of control and society's increasing, albeit
hesitant, acceptance of the technology and its inevitable effect on the
preservation of long-held societal norms.'82
In general, the socio-legal debate in the 1950s was still characterized
by technological visibility. But, although the popular, religious, and legal
debates were all similarly characterized by technological visibility, it was
the law and not social moral inhibitions or even religious promulgations
179. Secret of Al, supra note 175, at 81. However, it should be acknowledged that this stringent
selection process was consistent with the tradition of medical paternalism still prevalent at that time.
180. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 167-77; Lamson, supra note 163, at 1063; Weisman, supra
note 127, at 98.
181. Koemer, supra note 50, at 494; John H. Schlemer, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 52 J.
MICH. ST. MED. SOC'Y 418, 419-20 (1953); Seymour & Koerner, supra note 83, at 1531-32; A
Parvenu Intrudes, supra note 176.
182. Apparently, although the choice frame of meaning was a powerful tool in achieving social
change for women in other contexts, it proved inferior to the cure frame of meaning in the context of
this technological debate. This may be explained by the important role played by the physicians. The
physicians' ability to mobilize social change hinged on the conceptualization of the issue within their
area of expertise, that is, cures for disease.
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which served as the main inhibiting force of the acceptance of AI. The
law, in its efforts to channel society into nuclear family units, clutched on
to out-dated modes of control which were counter-productive in
achieving this goal. Nevertheless, AI's popularity kept rising, thanks
mainly to the efforts of the medical profession, which perceived the
technology through a powerful change-inducing frame of meaning and
mediated between the public's desire to use the technology and the
inhibitions imposed by the law.
IV. AN ERA OF LEGALIZATION
It was retrospectively concluded that AID finally became popular only
in the 1960s.5 3 This coincided with a change in the legal position, which
was reflected in the trend of legalization that took place primarily from
the mid-1960s through the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1960s there
was still no comprehensive statistical survey that studied the popularity
of AL. One estimate made at the beginning of the 1960s stated that over
10,000 AID children were alive in the United States.184 Another report
stated that 1,000-1,200 babies were born annually as a result of the
procedure while there were 50,000 persons in the United States who
were conceived through the technology.'85 By 1977, a reliable
comprehensive statistical study was done which estimated that 6,000-
10,000 AID children were born annually in the United States. 86 Despite
the variations in reports there apparently was a significant increase in the
use of the procedure during this period.
The application of AI to a larger number of infertility conditions
became possible in the 1960s through the opening of sperm banks.
Sperm banks facilitated the practice of AID and improved AIH
techniques. Moreover, their existence opened the door to new uses,
183. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 19 (1988).
184. Lawrence Banks, Aspects of Adoption and Artificial Insemination, in PROGRESS IN
INFERTILITY, supra note 173, at 711, 714.
185. 1,100 Births a Year Linked to Artificial Conception, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1962, at 5. The
report relied on a statement made in The New Physician, the journal of the Student American
Medical Association. However, it is unclear whether the statistics reported are related to AI in
general or merely to AID.
186. Martin Curie Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the
United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 588 (1979). The writers noted that previous estimates
were at times as high as 20,000 births per year; however, these estimates lacked reliable data to
support them.
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enabling men to preserve their sperm in advance. Sperm preservation
was used when men knew they would be exposed to radiation in their
line of work or through medical treatment or when they were about to
undergo surgery which might destroy their reproductive capacity. This
was also an option for men with weak sperm who chose to conserve it in
case of future deterioration."8 7 But, despite the effect of sperm banks on
the number of potential users, this was not truly an innovative
technological shift. As discussed earlier, the technology had existed since
at least 1953, but was not used. It is, thus, evident that despite its
contribution to the increase in the number of users, sperm banks were not
the main force behind the increase in the popularity of Al.
Two main reasons were offered for the successful diffusion of AID in
the 1960s. The first was the passage of laws governing the paternity and
legitimacy of children conceived by AID and the second was greater
awareness of AID as an option for infertile couples.'88 The second reason
was, most likely, at least partly affected by the first. Legalization of the
procedure probably made doctors more comfortable about offering it to
their patients. Furthermore, the enactment of these statutes increased the
publicity of the procedure. 89 But both were clearly influenced by a third
factor-an unrelated technological innovation-the pill. The pill was put
on the market in 1960. Within only two years, 1.2 million American
women were using it.' 90 The pill, like no other contraceptive device that
preceded it, gave women control over their bodies through the removal
of reproduction from sex. This was the peak of the process of the
removal of reproduction from sex, which began in the nineteenth-
century. Like preceding developments in the birth control revolution, this
development, no doubt, affected the parallel revolution of the removal of
187. Smith, supra note 121, at 146-47. The growing popularity of sperm banks was linked
specifically to the sudden popularity of vasectomies. Sperm banks enabled men undergoing
vasectomies to preserve sperm in case of a subsequent change of heart. See Banlangfor Tomorrow,
COMMONWEAL, Apr. 28, 1972, at 178.
188. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 183. The task force
mentioned a third reason: lack of a sufficient number of children for adoption. Although this trend
probably developed gradually through the 1960s its effects became particularly prominent during the
1970s.
189. See, e.g., Domestic Relations: The Child of Artificial Insemination, TIME, April 14, 1967, at
79-80; Oklahoma Backs Artificial Births, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1967, at 24.
190. The Birth Control Pill at
http://fubini.swarthmore.edu/-WS30WS30F1998/akussac3.html#history (last visited Oct. 18,
2002).
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sex from reproduction, which was directly related to the socio-
acceptance process of AV9
It was in the 1960s that the long awaited legal shift began taking
place. The legal awakening of the 1960s was characterized by several
well-publicized AID cases, accompanied finally by the enactment of
state statutes regulating AV92 The first case was Gursky v. Gursky,193
decided in 1963. The two issues before the New York Supreme Court
were (1) the legitimacy of the child born through A-lD with the husband's
consent; and (2) support for the child born through AI)M9
When faced with the traditional concept of illegitimacy, the Gursky
court was apparently still influenced by the underlying sex and
procreation connection. The Gursky court refrained from reading into the
state statute defining legitimacy'95 a modification to the historical
concept that "a child who is begotten through a father who is not the
mother's husband is deemed to be illegitimate." The court stated that the
fact that the legislature did not choose to modify the concept of
illegitimacy, as it did in other cases, leads to the conclusion that the
traditional framework must be applied.'96
While the traditional framework, applied in the discussion of the
legitimacy issue, held the Gursky court back the court managed to break
away from it when turning to the subject of support by applying
contractual legal concepts. The court held that the husband has a duty to
support the child under the doctrines of implied contract and promissory
estoppel. First, the court held that the husband's declaration, conduct,
and written consent to the insemination constituted an implied promise to
support the child that, when combined with the wife's concurrence and
submission to AI, constituted an implied contract." Alternatively, the
court held under the doctrine of promissory estoppel that there was
nothing in the record that showed that the wife would have gone through
the procedure without her husband's consent. It, therefore, presumed that
191. See ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 6-11 (1990).
192. For the publicity of the AID cases, see for example, Artificial Insemination Ruled
Nonsupport Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 30, 1967, at 21; Court Here Rules on Test-Tube Baby, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1963, at 52; Court Ruling Asked on Support Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1962, at 32;
Domestic Relations, supra note 157.
193. 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
194. See generally id.
195. Id. at 410 (quoting Domestic Relations Law § 24.)
196. See id. at 406-11.
197. See id. at 411.
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she was induced to act by his consent and that she changed her position
to her detriment in reliance upon her husband's express wishes. 9 Thus,
once the court escaped the historically limiting framework of family law,
with its embedded connection between sex and procreation, it was able to
accommodate, at least as for the support issue, the new realities of the
technology of AI.
Another significant feature of Gursky is its weaker form of
technological visibility. The artificial nature of the technology was no
longer at issue. Nevertheless, the focus on the intent of the parties
concerned the planned nature of the procedure. Although both natural
conception and conception by AI may be planned, the Court focused here
on the specific type of long-term planning which accompanies the AID
procedure.
In 1964, after years of tension between the nature of the family as
embedded in the technology of AI and the traditional concepts of family
law, the first legislative action was taken to harmonize law with the
contemporary frame of meaning held by most infertility practitioners and
the majority of the public.'99
The reason for legislative inaction to this point is unclear. Several
possibilities were raised around this period: (1) the belief that the
evidentiary presumptions would solve the problem; (2) lack of public
awareness that the problem existed; (3) religious taboos; and (4)
predictions of the dire social consequences of AID.20 The reasons which
finally caused the different legislative bodies to act most likely included:
(1) the increasing popularity of the practice; (2) the sexual revolution of
the 1960s; and (3) the persistent uncertainty induced through
contradictory legal opinions, which the evidentiary presumption
obviously delayed but did not altogether prevent.
198. See id. at 411-12. This decision was followed by another New York Supreme Court case
where the court on similar facts concluded that the husband was liable for support since there was an
implied contract between the parties. The legal debate in this case was also characterized by a
weaker form of technological visibility. See generally Anonymous v. Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d
835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
199. It is important to note here that despite contradictory court opinions, no legislative body
declared AID illegitimate. And although at least two bills to that effect were introduced in Minnesota
in 1949 and in Ohio in 1955, neither became law. Note, A Legislative Approach to Artificial
Insemination, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 497,498-99 (1968) [hereinafter A Legislative Approach].
200. Id. at 51L.
1086
Vol. 77:1035, 2002
Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies
The first statute to legitimize Al was enacted in Georgia.2"' The statute
provided for a conclusive presumption of legitimacy of a child born
through AID when performed with the written consent of both husband
and wife. It also regulated Al by permitting only licensed physicians to
perform the procedure and made it a felony for anyone else, presumably
the inseminee, to do so.2 2
In 1967, Oklahoma enacted the second state statute to regulate AL.
This statute affirmatively permitted the practice of AID by a licensed
physician when so requested by a husband and wife, both of whom had
to consent in writing.2"3 The statute banned the use of AID under any
other circumstances, but no penalty was prescribed. In addition, it
prescribed that the consent for AD must be executed and acknowledged
by the husband, wife, AID practitioner, and a judge having jurisdiction
over the adoption of children. An original of the consent was to be filed
with the court, which must maintain confidentiality. Any child born as a
result would be considered legitimate.2 4 A third statute, similarly,
requiring written consent by the couple to be filed in court and thereby
legitimizing the born child was adopted by Kansas in 1968.20'
The parallel shift to direct modification of family law concepts
reached the courts in 1968.6 The famous California case of People v.
Sorensen 7 was decided on facts similar to those of the Gursky case28
The court reached the same result, however, without resorting to contract
law but by dealing directly with both the procedural impediment of the
evidentiary presumption of legitimacy and the traditional family law
concepts of fatherhood, adultery, and illegitimacy. The court proceeded
to find the child legitimate and the husband to be the father with an
obligation to support the child.2"9
As for the evidentiary presumption of legitimacy, the Sorenson court
admitted that the case could be disposed of on the ground that the
201 GA. CODEANN. § 74-9904 (Supp. 1968).
202. See Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64
Nw. U. L. REv. 777, 794 (1969-1970).
203. Id. at 794; A Legislative Approach, supra note 199, at 498.
204. Wadlington, supra note 202, at 794-95; A Legislative Approach, supra note 199, at 498.
205. Wadlington, supra note 202, at 796.
206. Direct modification of family law concepts is distinguished in this Article from the artificial
by-pass with concepts such as "semi-adoption" which was used by the Strnad court.
207. 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968).
208. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
209. See Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495.
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husband failed to overcome the presumption that "[a] child of a woman
who is or has been married, born during the marriage or within 300 days
after the dissolution thereof, is presumed to be the legitimate child of that
marriage.,, 2'0 However, without much of an explanation, the Sorenson
court chose to proceed into the facts of the case and determine whether a
husband, who consented to the artificial insemination of his wife with the
semen of a third-party donor, was guilty of the crime of failing to support
the child conceived through such insemination n.2 1  The court's move
might be explained by the fact that the legitimacy presumption was
relaxed with time in several jurisdictions. However, since the relaxation
of the presumption took place gradually through several centuries this
move was more likely motivated by an urgency to resolve the matter on
its face.212
The court then proceeded to examine the issue through family law
concepts. It first examined the concept of a "father" which was not
examined by the courts in past AI cases. The court concluded that the
term "father" in § 270 could not be limited to the biologic or natural
father, as those terms are generally understood. The court held that the
determinative factor was whether the legal relationship of father and
child exists. This is because a child born through AID does not have a
"natural father" as the term is usually used. Because there is no natural
father, the court reasoned, one can only look for the legal one.2 '3 The
court used the husband's consent to conclude that the word "father"
includes a husband who, unable to accomplish his objective of creating a
210. Id. at 497 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 661 (West)).
211. Id. at 497-98. § 270 of the California Penal Code provided that a father, of either a
legitimate or illegitimate child, who willfully omits to provide support for his child is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
212. The doctrine developed in stages. At the outset the legitimacy presumption was one of the
strongest presumptions in existence and was viewed as conclusive. There was no disputing the
presumption unless the husband was absent "beyond the four seas" of England or was impotent. But
after gradual relaxation through five centuries the conclusive feature was almost entirely removed in
England. SCHATKIN, supra note 174, at 445-46 (3d ed. 1956); 41 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 24, § 10;
9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW, § 2526, at 527-28 (3d ed. 1940). By the 1960s the presumption could be
overcome in some United States jurisdictions by showing that (1) the husband was impotent; (2) the
husband was present at the time of conception but under such circumstances that offer clear proof
that no intercourse could have taken place between him and his wife; (3) the child in question was of
a different race or color from the husband; (4) the blood groups of the parents and the child were
such that the husband could not have been the father of the child; or that (5) the husband could not
have been present at the time conception has taken place. Verkauf, supra note 126, at 303.
213. Sorensen, 437 P.2d at 497.
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child by using his own semen, purchases semen from a donor and uses it
to inseminate his wife.
14
The analysis of the concept of "fatherhood" demonstrates several
important features of the evolving legal debate. First, a weaker form of
technological visibility again characterizes the analysis. This weaker
form of technological visibility does not deal with the artificiality of the
technology as contrasted with natural conception but does indirectly take
into account certain characteristics of the technology, such as the
payment for the sperm of another man. Secondly, the concept of consent
was injected into family law doctrine and altered its traditional
framework instead of merely justifying the result through use of contract
law. Third, the analysis manifested a relatively direct acceptance of
procreation without resort to sexual intercourse within the nuclear
family. A direct acknowledgement of a non-genetic, technologically
constructed family relationship was made in lieu of a mere rejection of
the traditional modes of control. However, it must also be noted that the
judgment still lacked an express discussion of the social ramifications of
Al.
The Sorenson court did, in addition, comment on the issues of
illegitimacy and adultery. This analysis was still characterized by strong
technological visibility, manifested in the comparison between sexual
relations to the procedure of Al. The court concluded that the public
policy of the state favors legitimization and that, in the absence of
legislation prohibiting AI, the offspring is not the product of an
adulterous relationship.1 5
Thus, by the end of the 1960s, a shift occurred in both the discourse
and the substance of the legal debate surrounding AL. The shift in the
discourse was evidenced by the decrease in the level of technological
visibility. Although the debate was still generally characterized by
technological visibility the focus was no longer on the technology itself
but on its ancillary features. The substantive shift was evidenced by a
certain acceptance, both direct and indirect, of the family concept
embedded in the technology. This shift was manifested through the
embrace, to a certain extent, of the notion of procreation without sexual
intercourse within the nuclear family unit and its consequent alternative
family forms. The relatively direct acceptance was demonstrated through
the legislative modification of traditional family law terminology. The
214. Id. at 498.
215. Id. at 501.
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indirect acceptance was manifested through the abandonment of the
controlling tie between sex and procreation and the use of contractual
legal concepts to legitimize AI.
The trend of legalization and its consequent direct modification of
family law concepts to accommodate the technology of AI continued
through the 1970s. A major stabilizing force was the adoption in 1973 of
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).216 The goal of the UPA was to
guarantee substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the
marital status of their parents.217 Section five of the UPA specifically
regulated AI. The UPA provided that AID with the husband's consent is
legal and further that the donor is not perceived to be the natural father.218
By the end of the 1970s at least fifteen states had statutes regulating
AI and specifically mentioning AID. 219 All provided that the resulting
child was the natural child of the recipient's husband if the husband
consented to the procedure. Five states required that the consent be filed
with a state agency and six states, either directly or by implication,
limited the practice of AID to physicians. 0 By 1981, this number had
grown to twenty-three states, 221' and by 1985 twenty-eight states had AI
statutes. 2' Nine of the statutes were modeled after the UPA.m Although
there were certain variations among the states, most importantly, all the
statutes made clear that the offspring of the donor sperm will be treated
as the legal offspring of the consenting husband for legitimacy,
inheritance, and support purposes."2 4 This acceptance of the wife's
216. Unif. Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001).
217. Carol A. Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood-by-Choice, 11
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 208 (1982-1983).
218. See Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407.
219. The following states adopted Al statutes: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and
Washington. See George J. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm
Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1,2 n.2 (1980).
220. See id. at 2-3, n.2.
221. The additional states were: Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial
Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 10-11
(1981).
222. The additional states were: Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, New Jersey and Vermont. See Judith
Lynn Bick Rice, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1055, 1062 (1985).
223. Id.
224. BLANK, supra note 191, at 116-17b; UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL & SOCIAL CHOICES, OTA-BA-358, at 244 (1988).
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husband as the legal father in effect, cut off the rights and duties of the
donor.
Not all states took part in the legislation process. Nevertheless, once
the legalization process commenced, case la* was generally uniform in
holding that the AID child is legitimate and that the husband has the
rights and duties of a father.' Furthermore, despite the fact that AI
statutes were not adopted in all states, the legal acceptance of the
consequences of the basic AI procedure was emphasized by the
appearance in the 1990s of a new type of argument. Men who
unintentionally impregnated women outside the scope of marriage
through sexual intercourse began arguing that this was "artificial
insemination by intercourse," and like sperm donors, they had no duties
toward the child. 6 Although courts would not accept this argument, the
fact that such an argument was raised at all points to the naturalness with
which the status of the AI child was now perceived. 7
It should be noted, however, that where impregnation through sexual
intercourse was purposeful, that is, the purpose of the intercourse was to
provide a single woman with a child, courts have reached the same
result. Courts repeatedly rejected the argument that like the sperm donor,
these men had no duties toward the child, thus, refusing to equate the
situation with that of a donor through Al." The refusal to accept the
artificial insemination by intercourse argument in these cases points to
225. The following cases were decided in the absence of Al legislation: Levin v. Levin, 645
N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1994); K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); In re Baby Doe, 353
S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987). The following cases were similarly decided in states where AI legislation
was enacted: R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Lane v. Lane, 1996-NMCA-23, 912
P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); State ex rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1982); Jackson
v. Jackson, 739 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App. 1991);
S.C. v. RC., 476 N.W.2d 25 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). But see Schoenfeld v. Apfel, Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 237 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that children were not the husband's where they were
openly stated to be those of the donor, and the issue only came up after the hulband's death when the
mother applied for the children's social security benefits); In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen,
667 N.E.2d 122 (1. App. Ct. 1996) (holding written consent requirement to be prerequisite to
establishment of parent-child relationship, but deciding husband's obvious lack of consent
manifested by his use of condoms during intercourse prevented his fathering of a child).
226. See, e.g., Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1994); Piatt v. Schultz, No. 03-97-
0014-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 5024, *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 13, 1998).
227. See, eg., Straub, 645 N.E.2d at 601.
228. See, eg., Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1169 (D.C. 1993); In re Marriage of Adams, 701
N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (11. App. Ct. 1998); Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607, 609 (S.D. 1993); Kesler v.
Weniger, 744 A.2d 794,796 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2000).
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the limits of AI's acceptance-Al has not to this day achieved equal
standing with sexual intercourse.
Legalization, as noted, was accompanied with a significant increase in
the popularity of AI. Therefore, it is relevant to inquire into the effect of
legalization on the practices employed by the medical profession. The
examination of this relationship can shed additional light on the impact
of legalization on the practice of AI in general.
A comprehensive study performed in 1977 among those physicians
most likely to perform AI revealed that even among this select group
nineteen percent did not perform AID and those who did perform it did
so on a relatively small scale."29 These results are somewhat surprising,
although they may be related to the resources necessary to maintain an
AID practice and not the reluctance to perform AID.
An examination of physicians' practices related to AID disclosed a
mixed picture, demonstrating only a partial disappearance of the
practices conjured to combat legal uncertainty. The practice of mixing
donor semen with the husband's sperm nearly disappeared. 0 Apparently
some physicians still advocated the practice for the psychological benefit
of the husband, however, others perceived it to be psychologically
unsound arguing that the decision to have an AID child should be a
mature one.' The practical abandonment of the practice points to an
increased sense of legal certainty among physicians with regard to the
acceptance of Al. Legal certainty with regard to the legitimacy of the
child eliminated the need to hide the child's origin as an AID child.
Although it must be acknowledged that the renunciation of the sperm
mixing practice apparently resulted from the elimination of both the
psychological and legal motivations.
Yet, at the same time, it was revealed that some of the traditional
measures of confidentiality employed by doctors were still in use. For
example, some of the physicians surveyed suggested that their patients
conceal the use of AID from their obstetricians, in order to enable the
obstetrician to register the husband's name on the birth certificate in
229. See Curie Cohen et al., supra note 186, at 588.
230. See id. at 587.
231. See ELIZABETH NOBLE, supra note 133, at 92; Barbara Eck Menning, Donor Insemination:
The Psychosocial Issues, 18 CONTEMP. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 155, 162 (1981); Sergio C.
Stone, Complications and Pitfalls of Artificial Insemination, 23(4) CLINICAL OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 667, 680 (1980).
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good faith. 2 It was also found that many of the physicians still refrained
from keeping permanent records regarding children born through AL.
This tendency was pronounced when the identity of the donor was at
issue. Physicians were primarily concerned with the anonymity of the
donor. A new technique evolved, involving the use of multiple donor
sperm within different inseminations in the same cycle. This method also
helped preserve the donor's anonymity. 3 These findings shed some
doubt regarding the impact of legalization on the practice of AL.
However, several possible explanations may clarify the situation.
The first explanation relates to the justification given by many
physicians that maintaining paternity records is problematic in light of
recent court orders to open records of adoption agencies."4 If this were
the case the stability achieved by the legalization of AI may have been
compromised at least in part by a parallel legal change.
Second, despite a certain trend toward letting an AD child know his
origin, physicians continued to advise couples to keep this fact secret for
the psychological benefit of the child. 5 In that case, lingering legal
uncertainty may not have been the cause but the remains of condemning
social norms.
Third, it may be that old habits were hard to lose and the medical
profession, accustomed to the aura of secrecy, took longer to adjust to the
new socio-legal reality. An article published in 1976 in the important
American Fertility Society journal-Fertility and Sterility-supports
this. Although the writer concluded that due to the courts' decisions the
legal status of an AID child was not very vulnerable, he mistakenly
stated that only three states so far provided that AID was legal and that
the children conceived through AID were legitimate. 6 Similar
sentiments pronouncing the remaining legal uncertainty continued to
appear in professional journals.37 Although, as discussed above, the case
232. Curie Cohen et al., supra note 186, at 589.
233. Id. at 588-89.
234. Id. at 589.
235. Eck Menning, supra note 231, at 163. This practice, in fact, persists to this day. See S.Rt
Leiblum & A.L. Aviv, Disclosure Issues and Decisions of Couples Who Conceived via Donor
Insemination, 18 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 292 (1997).
236. William IV. Beck, A Critical Look at the Legal, Ethical and Technical Aspects of Artifcial
Insemination, in 27(1) FERTILITY & STERILITY 1, 2-3 (1976).
237. See, e-g., Richard D. Amelar & Lawrence Dubin, Artificial Donor Insemination (AID), in
MALE INFERTILITY 237, 243-44 (Richard D. Amelar, et al. eds., 1977); Eck Menning, supra note
231, at 158. But see WILFRED J. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION WITH HUSBAND SPERM 20
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law in states where no AI statutes were enacted did not divert from the
judicial decisions in states where such legislation did come into force, the
geographical partiality of the legalization may still have created an aura
of uncertainty.
Apparently, the influences of legalization took effect gradually.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive study done by the Office of Technology
Assessment in 1987 revealed further changes in the practice of AL. AI
overall was perceived as a common practice. Approximately 172,000
women underwent AI in that year in the United States."5 The study
revealed that the use of AIH had expanded due to the popularity of sperm
banks. The list of reasons for storing semen expanded to include sperm
storing (1) due to an unspecified fear of future infertility; (2) geographic
separation from spouse; (3) as a back-up for in vitro fertilization or
gamete intrafallopian transfer; and (4) due to a desire to have children
after death."'
The study revealed that thirty-eight percent of the physicians treating
infertility problems would provide AIH while twenty-four percent would
provide AID.240 At first blush, these results seem quite unexpected.
However, upon further review, the survey's data reveals that of those
physicians not offering AI, nearly half explained the procedure was not
part of their practice.2"' Only ten percent cited fear of litigation or
liability (distinguished from fears as to the illegality of the procedure) as
a reason for not offering AI or AID services and merely five percent
cited personal or ethical objections.242
At the same time the study revealed the remnants of past paternalistic
practices, in particular with regard to AID. It appeared that about half of
the physicians who provided Al utilized a personality assessment as part
of their determination of whether the patient should go through the
procedure (other factors were mainly medical ones).243 As discussed
above, in the 1940s-1950s doctors heavily scrutinized their patients and
(1980) (stating that new statutes and court rulings removed some of the legal complications
previously surrounding AID).
238. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION:
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY: BACKGROUND PAPER, at 15 (1988).
239. See id. at 63.
240. See id. at 15.
241. Id.
242. See id. In addition, three percent cited lack of donors while three percent cited lack of
facilities as preventing the practice.
243. Id. at 24.
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carefully selected those who may go through the procedure.2" This was
partly a result of the paternalistic attitude of the medical profession and
partly an effort by physicians to combat legal uncertainty by selecting
patients whose family life was less likely to erupt and lead to litigation.
The use of a personality assessments in the 1980's was a surprising
remnant of this practice. The question, therefore, becomes whether legal
uncertainty persisted into the late 1980s or whether such scrutiny was
never the result of legal implications but an inherent part of what
physicians viewed to be responsible medical practice.
Further study into the data of this practice demonstrates two things.
First, the personality assessment utilized in the 1980s was different from
that used in the 1950s in that a major part of it was focused on
standardized psychological assessment and other evaluations used to
diagnose mental illness or to address general concerns of fitness for
pregnancy or motherhood. 5 Furthermore, only five percent of the
physicians indicated that they rejected a patient because they perceived
the marriage to be unstable, one percent indicated that they did so
because the couple was not ready, and two percent because the husband
did not agree.246 Thus, it seems that the focus was no longer on the
stability of the marriage of the applying couple. Second, the data
overwhelmingly demonstrated that young physicians were far less likely
(only twenty-nine percent) than older physicians (sixty percent) to
require personality assessment tests.247 Therefore, as discussed with
regard to the physicians' practices in the 1970s, it is apparent that old
habits tended to linger. Older physicians continued to apply practices
prevalent earlier in their careers.
It must be acknowledged that the personality assessment requirement
reflected some lingering uneasiness as to the social implications of the
procedure, especially since it was performed more in cases of AID (fifty-
four to fifty-nine percent) and not of AIII (thirty-eight percent).248 But
again, the data demonstrated that these attitudes changed among younger
physicians and among women physicians, only thirty-nine percent of
whom (as opposed to fifty-three percent overall) required these tests.249 It
244. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
245. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 238, at 25.
246. Id. at 27.
247. Id. at 25.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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should also be noted that the shift in the use of psychological evaluations
was apparently unrelated to a new consensus in that matter. The debate
was still open with regard to the need of such an evaluation.
The 1987 survey also evidenced a change with regard to the
maintenance of records. Fifty-four percent of those who regularly
practiced AI kept records permitting them to match donors to the
pregnancies resulting from use of the donor's sperm.25' Data from the
survey shows that maintenance of records was correlated with whether
AID or just AIH was practiced and with the size of the practice. Most
physicians, however, refused access to most parties and half of them
even refused judicial requests. 2  Record keeping was even more
prevalent in sperm banks where eleven out of fifteen sperm banks kept
detailed records. 53 In the past, despite the obvious medical benefits of
providing the AID child with a family medical history, physicians were
wary of maintaining these records due to their fear of future legal
complications. This shift, albeit gradual, manifested the long-term effects
of legalization.
Thus, legalization was accompanied by a shift in both the legal
discourse and the social acceptance of the technology, and its alternative
concept of the family. In the legal debate, one could observe a gradual
change in the legal discourse toward a weaker form of technological
visibility. This was accompanied by direct and indirect substantive shifts
in legal analysis. Legal reasoning achieved the shift directly by
modifying family law concepts. At the same time, it accomplished the
shift indirectly by invoking contract doctrine and by weakening the sex
and procreation tie. On the social front, the relationship between the vast
popularity of AI and legalization could also be seen through the gradual,
although incomplete, abandonment of medical practices designed to
mediate between legal uncertainty and social use.
Hence, one could observe a shift in the socio-legal position toward a
certain acceptance of the AI technology and the alternative concept of
the family embedded within it. However, as will be discussed, this
250. See, e.g., Sander S. Shapiro, Some Unresolved Questions About Artificial Insemination, 17
CONTEMP. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 129, 134-35 (Jan. 1981); Herbert Waltzer, Psychological
and Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination (A.I.D.): An Overview, 36(1) AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY
91, 98-99 (1982).
251. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 238, at 46.
252. Id. at 46-47.
253. Id. at 70.
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acceptance was only of a superficial nature. Any illusion of complete
acceptance was shattered with the evolution of new applications for AI in
the 1970s.
V. ROCKING THE BOAT: UNMARRIED WOMEN AND
SURROGACY
At the same time that the practice of AI and especially AID finally
gained social and legal legitimacy, the boat was rocked again. The source
of controversy was the evolution of two new uses for the technology.
One application was traditional surrogate motherhood. This involved
artificial insemination of a woman who was not the woman planning to
raise the child. The other application involved the use of AI by single
women and lesbians. Thus, the technology of AI found itself again in the
midst of a social and legal controversy perhaps even larger than any
before due to the sensationalization of the new applications in the mass
media.
The emergence of these new social uses took place in the mid-1970s.
At that time, the diffusion of AIH and AID increased significantly. This
was demonstrated for one in the great growth in the number of semen
banks. 4 Moreover, an unrelated techno-social phenomenon increased
the resort to AID. This was the fact that by the 1970s, adoption was no
longer an option for most people as the number of babies available for
adoption fell dramatically. 5 The availability of contraception and
liberalized abortion options in the years following Roe v. Wade made AI
the only alternative for many couples who wanted to have children' 6
Furthermore, it is possible that fewer children were placed for adoption
due to a decrease in the stigma of birth out of wedlock. The statistics
were overwhelming. While in 1968 almost eighty percent of out-of-
wedlock children were placed for adoption, the figure was only four
percent by 1983.7 Thus, it was in this relatively hospitable climate to AI
that new uses for the technology emerged. These uses underscored the
254. Mark S. Frankel, Human-Semen Banking: Social and Public Policy Issues, 1 MAN & MED.
289, 289 (1976).
255. Jacqueline Hornor Plumez, Adoption: Where Have All the Babies Gone? N.Y. TIMES
(Magazine), Apr. 13, 1980, § 6, at 34.
256. Beck, supra note 236, at 1.
257. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 183, at 14 n.1.
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fragility and incompleteness of the newly achieved socio-legal
acceptance of the technology of AL.
A. Artificial Insemination as the Resort for Unmarried Women
As AI became more popular, commentators began to speculate with
regard to the possibility of use by unmarried women. Advocates of AI in
past decades could not fathom the idea and viewed the application of AI
to spinsters, widows, or divorcees to be an abuse of the procedureY8
This was not really an issue during preceding decades because neither
society nor its unmarried women constituency were ready to endorse
such use.
This changed in the 1970s. The AID survey conducted in 1977
demonstrated, to the manifest surprise of its authors, that the third most
cited reason for AID after the husband's infertility and avoiding the
transmission of a genetic disease, was to provide natural children to
women without a male partner."' About ten percent of the physicians
surveyed performed AID on women without a male partners.' Reports
at the beginning of the 1980s estimated that approximately 1500 single
women conceived through AI per year, one hundred fifty of them
lesbians."' This trend was accompanied by the circulation of self-help
guides for AI.262
By 1987 the number of women without male partners seeking AID
had further increased. Three percent of the women seeking Al were
identified as single women and an additional one percent identified
themselves as lesbians. This translated to approximately 4000 requests
from single women and 1000 requests from lesbians during that year.263
As the resort to AID by unmarried women (both heterosexual and
lesbian) became a trend, many physicians reacted by refusing to
258. SCHELLEN, supra note 27, at 208.
259. Curie Cohen et al., supra note 186, at 585.
260. Id.
261. Ann Taylor Flemming, New Frontiers in Conception, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), July 20, 1980,
§ 6, at 14.
262. Id.
263. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 238, at 23. One must
note, however, that the former data was of women who conceived through Al, while this data was of
those who requested the procedure. Since some were rejected and for some the procedure was
unsuccessful the difference between the number of single women and lesbians who actually
conceived in that year would be lower.
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artificially inseminate such women.M Moreover, institutions such as
sperm banks and fertility clinics often refused to accommodate single
women and lesbians.2" This was the case even when it was not the
purchase of sperm that was at issue but merely use of the facilities or of a
fertility drug.2e This reluctance was of extreme significance, considering
the vital role the physicians played in the past in mediating between the
use of AI technology and legal inhibitions.
The primary reason cited by physicians for their refusal to treat
unmarried women was uncertainty regarding the legality of the
procedure.2' Some physicians stated the belief that children should not
be born outside the traditional family.25 Reluctance was also related to
the perceived inability of unmarried women to adequately provide for the
child.269
Data collected in 1987 demonstrated that the controversy had not
subsided. The medical profession still inhibited the insemination of
single women and lesbians. The most common non-medical reason for
the rejection of a woman seeking AI was her being unmarried. Fifty-two
percent of the practitioners reported rejecting a patient on this basis.270
Fifteen percent of the physicians reported rejecting a patient because she
was a lesbian.27 Moreover, when asked directly, physicians were equally
divided as to whether or not they were likely to reject an unmarried
recipient.' If the unmarried recipient did not have a partner, the
proportion of physicians who were likely to reject her rose to sixty-one
percent.273 If the patient was a lesbian, the number increased to sixty-
three percent.7 Some change in attitudes can be discerned from the fact
264. Michele M. Melendez, A Right to Bear Children, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 4, 1998, at IF.
Absent an established patient/physician relationship, physicians are under no duty to treat a patient.
See generally Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
265. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 821 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977); Melendez, supra
note 264, at IF.
266. See CM., 377 A.2d at 821; Melendez, supra note 264, at IF.
267. Kritchevsky, supra note 221, at 17-18.
268. Maureen McGuire & Nancy J. Alexander, Artificial Insemination of Single Women, 43(2)
FERTILITY & STEmLrrY 182, at 182 (1985)
269. Kritchevsky, supra note 221, at 17.
270. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 238, at 27.
271. Id. The lower percentage for rejection of lesbians than that of single women was the result of
the fact that there were fewer such applicants in the first place.
272. Id. at 29.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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that physicians over the age of fifty were more likely to reject an
applicant for non-medical grounds.27 ' However, the figures were still
staggering.
The reluctance of the medical profession to advocate the new AI
practice was reflected in the 1994 report of the Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society on assisted reproductive technology. In its
discussion regarding the moral right to reproduce, the Committee stated
the following:
We believe that the child's best interest is served when it is born
and reared in the environment of a heterosexual couple in a stable
marriage. Therefore, we find it, in general, ethically questionable to
offer infertility services to single individuals who do not provide
this most appropriate environment. We realize that the practice is
too recent to have generated serious studies. Our reservations stem
from the overall desirability of a stable marriage for the child's
welfare.276
The unwillingness of many physicians to artificially inseminate
unmarried women reflected the general societal controversy surrounding
the issue. The popular press also conveyed mixed feelings with regard to
the practice. 77
275. Id. at 30. It is important to note, however, that where sperm banks were at issue, the study
did not indicate marital status or sexual orientation to be a basis for rejection of a recipient. This
indicated a change from former practice. Nevertheless, those practicing in sperm banks did share the
views of their colleagues.
276. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 62(5) FERTILITY & STERILITY i, 19s (Supp. 1 1994). But, at the
same time, the AID guidelines drafted by the Practice Committee of the American Fertility Society
enumerated the single female status as one of the conditions that warrant AID. The Practice
Committee of the American Fertility Society, Guidelines for Therapeutic Donor Insemination:
Sperm, 62(5) FERTILITY & STERILITY i, IOIS (Supp. 1 1994). This condition was a new addition,
which did not appear in the list of conditions enumerated in the Committee's 1986 and 1990
guidelines. Although the reports did include a single recipient consent form it was distinguished
from the married woman consent form in that the single woman's form contained a statement that
she shall not seek support for her child from those involved in the procedure. Compare Practice
Committee of the American Fertility Society, New Guidelines for the Use of Semen Donor
Insemination: 1986, 46(4) FERTILITY & STERILITY 95s, 95s-96s, 109s (Supp. 2 1986); Cf Practice
Committee of the American Fertility Society, New Guidelines for the Use of Semen Donor
Insemination: 1990, 53(3) FERTILITY & STERILITY IS, Is, 13s (Supp. 1 1990).
277. See, e.g., Georgia Dullea, Arti(ficial Insemination of Single Women Poses Difficult Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1979, at A18; James Lileks, When Did Insemination Become a Guaranteed
Right?, DENVER ROCKY MOuNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 19, 1995, at 37A; Diane K. Shah et al., Lesbian
Mothers, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1979, at 61.
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The medical profession, thus, unlike its role in the 1950s, did not
advocate the acceptance of the new use of AL. Even assuming that the
physicians' views merely mirrored those of the community at large, their
espousal of such views was of enhanced significance because of their
role as the gatekeepers of the practice of AI and their consequent ability
to implement these views to inhibit or greatly promote the use of the
technology. In the 1940s and1950s physicians advocated AI as a cure for
infertility. In their role as the healers of society it was only natural that
physicians would lead such a move. However, the resort of single
women, whether heterosexual or lesbians, to AI was viewed by many in
the public as a matter of choice and not as a cure for infertility. Such
sentiments were expressed by one commentator as follows: "[A]rtificial
insemination is as medically necessary as getting a tattoo .... [i]f a
doctor does not want to inseminate a lesbian couple for whatever reason,
the doctor must remain free to do so."278 Thus, it may not be surprising
that the community of physicians no longer led the way in promoting the
use of AL. In light of the mixed societal reaction, espousal of such views
could incur the risk of adverse publicity. Moreover, physicians were
apparently particularly cautious because without the perception that this
use of AI was a "cure," it would be harder for them to justify advocacy
of AI on the basis of their expertise. The influence of this attitude
eventually affected the extent of the use of the procedure by unmarried
Women and led to some novel encounters between the use of the
technology and the law. The new encounters between the law and the
technology of AI resulted from both the incomplete resolution achieved
through the legalization era of the 1960s and 1970s and the
unwillingness of many physicians to provide the procedure to unmarried
women.
The legal status of AID children born to unmarried women, whether
heterosexual or lesbian, was indeed unclear. As was the case with the
basic application of AI, a practical legal vacuum greeted the new use.
Neither Al legislation nor any court holding explicitly prohibited AI in
unmarried women.279 The wordings of the statutes left room for
278. Lileks, supra note 277.
279. In 1981 no Al statute, except Oregon's, explicitly mentioned unmarried women. Oregon's
statute required the woman's consent and, if she was married, the husband's as well. In addition, it
was arguable that the statutes of California, Colorado, Washington and Wyoming recognized a right
to Al for unmarried women. These statutes, while otherwise adopting the Uniform Parentage Act,
omitted the word "married" from the provision stating that the donor will not be treated as the
natural father. See Kritchevsky, supra note 221, at 18.
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interpretation. Six states enacted AI statutes providing that the donor is
not the legal father. Arguably, in such jurisdictions the mother was the
sole legal parent. -80 On the other hand, AI statutes in at least three states
explicitly required the consent of a woman and her husband.28 This
requirement could be interpreted to mean that AI could not be performed
without the consent of a husband, even in the case where no such
husband existed.
Despite the fact that the statutes did not expressly prohibit use of the
technology by unmarried women, many courts chose to interpret them to
differentiate between the rights of married and unmarried women. 82 The
fact that given the option many courts denied the protection of the AI
legislation to unmarried women points to the incomplete acceptance of
AI. Many of the judicial controversies, which required the application of
an AI statute, originated in the reluctance of the medical professionals to
enable unmarried women to use the technology. This rejection often led
unmarried women to (1) locate a sperm donor by themselves; or (2)
proceed to self inseminate themselves without medical assistance.
The first type of legal case was a direct result of the physicians'
unwillingness to enable unmarried women to undertake the procedure.
Such discriminatory practices included refusal to perform the procedure,
provide the sperm, or even provide fertility drugs.23 Albeit quite rare,
these cases involved suits alleging discrimination. In one unreported
federal district court case, Beatty v. Erhard,284 a lesbian couple was
rejected by a Minneapolis clinic because the clinic and its physician were
reluctant to perform AID on a lesbian. The couple sued for
discrimination in a public accommodation under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. The district court hinged its decision on the Minnesota
Parentage Act. It noted, that Minnesota could have amended its
Parentage Act, as was done by other states, by omitting the word
280. Donovan, supra note 217, at 220.
281. Id. at 218-19.
282. See generally In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr.
530 (Ct. App. 1986); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994), reconsideration
granted, 650 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1995), appeal dismissed without opinion, 655 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y.
1995).
283. See Beezy Marsh, Is a Lesbian Couple the Same as Any Other? N. ECHO, Apr. 16, 1997, at
12; Melendez, supra note 264; Nancy E. Roman, Law on Artificial Insemination is Still in Infancy,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at A8.
284. No. PI 95-4965 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 1995), quoted in Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without
Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, at 208 n.207 (1996).
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"married" in the provision providing that the donor shall not be treated as
the biological father of the child conceived through AL. The court
concluded that since the legislature chose not to provide such protection
for an unmarried woman it could not conclude that the state's Human
Rights Act applied here.2 85
The second type of legal case stemmed from unmarried women's
independent efforts to locate sperm without the aid of medical facilities.
This brought a new factor into the picture-the known donor. In AID
practice to this point, known donors were quite rare The first case
involving a known donor whose sperm was used to inseminate a single
woman was brought before the courts in 1977.286 The known donor cases
typically involved a donor whose identity was known to the mother and
who filed suit for visitation or custody of a child born through
insemination with his sperm. In the characteristic scenario the donor and
the mother agreed that there would be no relationship or a limited
relationship between the donor and the child. The donor then decided to
seek further rights based on the relationship that in fact developed after
the child was born. The conclusion often reached by the courts was that
the AI statute providing that the donor is not the natural father is
inapplicable in cases of known donors. Thus, the donor was held to be
the natural father.28
7
The third type of legal case resulted from the resort to self-
insemination. Many states adopted statutes which required that the
procedure be performed by a physician.288 Furthermore, one state
285. Harlow, supra 284, at 207-10; Mike Kaszuba, Lesbians Sue Clinic, STAR TRIB., Apr. 10,
1995, at IA.
286. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (NJ. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
287. See id. (enforcing support obligation on the husband); In re RtC., 775 P.2d 27, 27-35 (Colo.
1989); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (presumptively extending the
provision declaring the father not to be the natural donor to unmarried women). But see McIntyre v.
Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding the protection of the statute is maintained even
when the donor is not anonymous and despite an agreement to the contrary).
288. Currently, twenty-one states have adopted statutes referring to the execution of the procedure
by a physician. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202 (Michie 2001); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7613 (Deering 2001); COLO. REv. STAT. 19-4-106 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-
772 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 39-5402 (Michie 2000); 750 ILL.
COMp. STAT. 40/3 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2000); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 126.061 (Michie 2001); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6
(Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3111.90 (Anderson 2001); OKL. ST. TIT. 10, § 553 (2000);
OR. REv. STAT. § 677.360 (1999); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.26.050 (2001); Wis. STAT. § 891.40
(2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103 (Michie 2001).
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provided statutory protection to a physician or hospital that refused to
perform artificial insemination.289 Thus, some courts in states where such
statutes were enacted have held that where the woman failed to meet the
prerequisite of being inseminated by a physician, she was not entitled to
the protection of the provision declaring the donor not to be the natural
father.29 °
The development of the Al case law throughout the controversy
surrounding its use by unmarried women is distinguished by two
characteristics: (1) the incompleteness of the acceptance process
achieved through legalization is exhibited by the reluctance to accept the
alternative conception of the family embedded in the technology; and (2)
technological invisibility that is accompanied finally by an open legal
discussion of the social ramifications of the technology.
First, the rise of the controversy clearly demonstrated that the socio-
legal acceptance of AID and its ramifications did not amount to an
acceptance of the full ramifications of the technology; namely, the
alternative conception of the family resulting from the ability to
procreate without resort to sexual intercourse within the nuclear family.
The acceptance of AID and its ramifications with regard to the family
unit was at most a partial acceptance. True, the law abandoned the use of
the sex-procreation connection as a means to preserve the organic family
unit and accepted that the legal father does not necessarily have to be the
natural father. However, these concessions still enabled the maintenance
of the illusion of a traditional organic family composed of a mother, a
father, and a child. Use of AI by single women and lesbians led to the
creation of a single parent family or a two-mother family. These
alternative uses would have shattered any remaining illusion of the
traditional organic family unit. Thus, the socio-legal acceptance of the
full ramifications of the technology, that is, the exposed non-traditional
family unit, was obviously not yet achieved.
Second, the technology itself became invisible. The fact that a child
was conceived through the technology and did not become a part of the
family through other means (such as natural conception or adoption) no
longer played a part in the judicial determination. Instead, a major part of
289. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GENERAL § 20-214 (2001)- A similar Kansas bill groups AI with
other technological procedures such as abortion, cloning, and stem cell research and provides
extensive protection to physicians and medical facilities that refuse to participate in such procedures.
H.B. 2491,2001 Sess. (Kan. 2001).
290. See Jhordan, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38; but see McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 243.
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the discussion was dedicated to the relationship between the parties after
the child was born. The invisibility of the technology in this context
apparently resulted from two sources. The first was the legalization
process, which removed the technology itself from the center of the
debate. Although only partial, the overall process of legalization and
acceptance transformed the focus of the debate. The legitimacy of the use
of the technology itself was no longer at issue. Second, beginning in the
1980s and throughout the 1990s, the technology of AI became merely
one of many reproductive technologies. The technology of AI "merged"
with the other reproductive technologies and, as will be seen in the next
section dealing with surrogacy, the case law and pertinent legislation
failed to distinguish between the different technologies.
Importantly, this technological invisibility was accompanied by an
open discussion of the social ramifications of the technology. As was not
the case before, the issue of the acceptance of the alternative,
technologically constructed, family came out in the open not just through
the discussion of a specific family relation. Courts candidly admitted that
the issue at stake is the willingness to endorse the alternative family
forms.29' The open debate, nevertheless, did not inhibit the legal effort to
control the phenomenon through indirect means. The indirect modes of
control merely changed. For example, in a typical scenario where a
lesbian couple agreed to jointly raise a child, born to one partner through
AI, and later separated, many courts were reluctant to grant the partner
any parental rights including visitation rights.292 Judicial efforts to
indirectly control the technology were similarly reflected in some courts'
denial of petitions by a lesbian partner to adopt an AID child or denial of
petitions by lesbian couples for allocation of parental rights. These
petitions were denied despite the support by the biological mother.293
291. See, eg., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 556-58 (N.J. 2000) (Long, J., concurring) ("the
nuclear family of husband and wife and their offspring is not the only method by which a parent-
child relationship can be created. The values attached to family life, although properly attributed to
the nuclear family model, can exist in other settings, including families created by unmarried persons
regardless of their sexual orientation."); Paraskevas v. Tunick, FA 95007398, 1997 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1101, *40 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 1997).
292. See generally Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); White v. Thompson (In
re Thompson), 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). But see T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000), affd, 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
293. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1038-41, 1063 (Conn. 1999) (denying
adoption by a lesbian partner); In re Ray, No. C-000436, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 548, *2-3, 8-10
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2001) (denying a petition for allocation of parental rights), appeal granted
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Paradoxically, the combination of the indirect means of control and
the technological invisibility in effect concealed the fact that a struggle
surrounding the acceptance of the technology was still taking place.
Under these circumstances the continuity argument was not raised. The
continuity argument would have raised the claim that since the same
technology is at issue as in AID the legal treatment should be equal.
However, technological invisibility combined with indirect means of
control made this form of legal debate unlikely.
Society has not, to this day, resolved the controversy surrounding use
of AI by single women and lesbians. Despite a certain trend toward
allowing parental rights, including visitation rights for a former lesbian
partner and same gender co-parent adoptions, use of AI by single women
and lesbians has not, to this date, gained socio-legal acceptance.294
Currently, only thirteen states' legislation contains statutory language in
which the term "married woman" does not appear in the provision
denying the donor of any rights and obligations toward the AID child.295
Furthermore, only three states provided further clarification by stating
that the donor is not the natural father unless a written contract has been
entered into.296 Thus, despite the fact that in three decades of renewed
controversy no state has banned unmarried women from access to AID
or enacted a statute distinguishing between heterosexual women and
lesbians regarding access to AID, the resistance to amend existing
statutes and the indirect judicial measures of control point to the
incomplete acceptance status of the technology.
sub nom., In re Bonfield, 751 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio 2001), motion granted, In re Ray, 756 N.E.2d 1236
(Ohio 2001).
294. See generally In re Guardianship of Oliva J., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000);
J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Farn. Ct. 2000); V.C., 748 A.2d 539; E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d
886 (Mass. 1999); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re Adoption of Two Children
by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). But see A.B. 820, 209th Leg. (N.J.
2000), a New Jersey Bill reacting to this trend by providing that a person who is not a natural parent
or an adoptive parent of a child has no custody or visitation rights over the objection of the natural or
adoptive parent.
295. See CAL. FAM CODE § 7613 (Deering 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2000); IDAHO
CODE § 39-5405 (Michie 2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 40/3 (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:3 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6
(Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (Anderson 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239
(1999); TEX. FAM. CODE § 151.101 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 2001); WIS.
STAT. § 891.40 (2000); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (2001).
296. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (WEST 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (MICHIE 2000);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 2001).
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To conclude, two factors stand out as the forces that inhibited the
acceptance of this new use of AL. The first is the absence of the
physicians as a mediating group between legal uncertainties, societal
inhibitions, and the desire of women to procreate. Because they did not
view AI for lesbians or single women to be a cure, they did not perform
the important mediating function they undertook in the 1940s and1950s.
On the contrary, the reluctance of many physicians to treat unmarried
women was the source of many of the legal encounters between those
seeking to use the technology and the law. These encounters escalated
the legal uncertainty regarding the use of the technology by unmarried
women, and further inhibited use of the technology. Furthermore, the
cure frame of meaning, which so far successfully led the campaign for
acceptance, became a trap. The absence of the physicians' promoting
efforts rendered it a much weaker mobilizing tool. In addition, the
historical use of the cure frame of meaning weakened the alternative
frame of meaning of choice in this context. Thus, those advocating AI
were now left without a powerful frame of meaning to promote their
efforts.
Second, the crisis manifested here demonstrates that the basic social
implication represented by AI-an alternative concept of the family
stemming from the ability to procreate without resort to sexual
intercourse within the traditional family unit-was never accepted. The
conception of a society divided into orderly organic units was not
abandoned. Thus, the acceptance of the basic technology of AI was at
most partial and its ability to aid the acceptance of the new application
was therefore limited. Importantly, it is the current invisibility of the
technology which conceals the fact that it is the acceptance process of the
technology and its social implication which remain at issue here and
masks the artificial nature of the resolution reached through the
legalization process which took place since the 1960s. At the same, it
should be emphasized that the change in the nature of the legal discourse
from a focus on the technological features to an open debate of the social
ramifications did not to this point resolve the controversy.
B. The Application ofArtificial Insemination to Surrogacy
Surrogacy by natural means-through intercourse between the
husband of an infertile woman and a fertile woman who agrees to carry
the child and hand it over to the infertile wife and her husband-was
practiced since biblical times. The bible tells the story of three slaves
Hagar, Bilhah, and Zilpah who gave birth and handed their children over
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to their mistresses Saral, Rachel, and Leah.297 Most likely such
arrangements existed through the years where a woman, sometimes a
relative or a friend, would carry and deliver a child for an infertile couple
on a purely altruistic basis. 298 However, the application of the technology
of Al to the practice of surrogacy, the first publicized case of which took
place in the mid-1970s, changed both the scale and the quality of the
practice.299 The application of the AI technology to the surrogate mother
arrangement required no further development in the state of the art of the
technology. Nevertheless, it produced a new social institution. AI
technology extended the practice of surrogacy to strangers who were
often motivated by monetary incentives. AI's ability to facilitate
surrogacy without requiring intercourse between the infertile women's
husband and the surrogate combined with the promised monetary reward,
extended the pool of potential candidates.
This novel application of AI created a new public storm of larger
proportions than ever before. Furthermore, the societal debate was
stimulated by the media-a factor which was less prevalent at the time
AID was debated in the 1940s-1950s.3°° Societal attitudes toward
surrogacy diverged sharply. Even the feminist movement, which
traditionally supported AI, was split because part of it viewed surrogacy
to be an exploitation of women."0 Notions of technological continuity
were not, in general, featured in the public debate. The phenomenon of
surrogacy, despite its complete reliance on old technology, was viewed
as a new scientific endeavor.
Religious authorities were also caught up in the public controversy.
Religious authorities, at times expressly and at times implicitly, tended to
follow the attitudes they established toward the basic application of AID.
Nevertheless, the new release of religious statements to respond to the
public uproar weakens the conclusion that religious authorities presumed
297. See Genesis 16:30; Genesis 30:1-7; Genesis 30:9-12.
298. Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women 's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113,117 (1997).
299. The tale of the first publicized modem surrogacy is told by Noel Keane the attomey who
handled the arrangement. See NOEL P. KEANE & DENNIS L. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 11-94
(1981).
300. See, e.g., Patricia A. Avery, Surrogate Mothers: Center of a New Storm, U.S. NEWS WORLD
REP., June 6, 1983, at 76; Otto Freidrich, A Legal, Moral and Social Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10,
1984, at 54; Jay Matthews, Surrogate Motherhood Becoming an American Growth Industry, WASH.
POST, Jan. 24, 1983, at A2; Andrea Sachs, And Baby Makes Four, TIME, Aug. 27, 1990, at 53;
Claudia Wallis, A Surrogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 53.
301. Kerian, supra note 298, at 158-61.
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technological continuity. The Catholic Church expressed strong
opposition to surrogacy viewing it as contrary to the unity of marriage
and the dignity of procreation of the human person.3"2 Both Protestant
and Jewish reactions were mixed. Most Orthodox Jewish authorities,
consistent with their attitude toward AID, viewed surrogacy as adultery
and condemned it on additional grounds such as the objection that it
constituted use of a person as an incubator.3"3 Conservative Jews
exhibited a range of views, while an organization of Reform Jewish
leaders issued a formal statement that surrogacy is acceptable in some
cases where other options are absent.3"
The use of AI to accomplish the surrogacy arrangement changed the
factual pattern to which the law began accommodating since the 1960s.
AI technology within the surrogacy arrangement now involved a known
third party who not only gave birth to the child but was also its genetic
mother through use of her ovum and who was required to relinquish all
rights to the child. Moreover, the sperm donor was now to be the
intended father. The new factual pattern created a new tension with
regard to traditional family law concepts. In the same way that AID split
the concept of fatherhood, surrogacy split the concept of motherhood-
one woman donated the egg and carried the child while the other raised
it. An examination of the development of the law relating to surrogacy
demonstrates that, at times, application of family law principles restricted
the execution of the surrogacy agreement on its terms. On the other hand,
where the courts resorted to contract law, the surrogacy agreement was
enforced according to its terms.
As discussed in previous sections, a general goal of family law was to
preserve the traditional organic family unit. Thus, family law principles
maintained an inherent resistance to the consequences of any technology
that created a non-traditional family cell. The practice of surrogacy, on
its face, conflicted with certain family law provisions, most prominently
baby selling provisions of adoption statutes and statutes regulating Al.
Thus, family law principles often acted to prevent the termination of the
rights of the surrogate mother-the biological mother who gave birth to
302. THE NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 183, at 100-01. In 1987
Pope John Paul II issued a statement that: "The child has the right to be conceived, carried in the
womb, brought into the world and brought up within marriage: it is through the secure and
recognized relationship to his own parents that the child can discover his own identity and achieve
his own proper human development." Kerian, supra note 298, at 153.
303. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 183, at 101-03.
304. Id.
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the child-who was viewed as the traditional primary caretaker. Where
such principles were applied, judicial determinations did not always
reflect the original surrogacy arrangement but some variation, which
took into account the interests of the surrogate. For example, in In re
Baby M.,305 the court decided the case on family law principles and the
surrogate mother was granted visitation rights.
306
Application of family law principles to surrogacy did not always result
in a refusal to enforce a surrogacy agreement according to its terms. The
result of the judicial determination depended on the specific family law
principle at issue. Conflicts with the baby sale provisions of adoption
statutes arose due to the commercial element of the surrogacy
arrangement.30 7 Surrogacy came into direct conflict with these statutes
because the surrogacy procedure included a legal adoption of the child
by the intended mother. Unlike the practice of AID where anonymity and
secrecy could be preserved, use of AI through surrogacy mandated the
parties' resort to the law even before a conflict developed.0 8
Nevertheless, courts came to contradictory results with regard to these
conflicts. Some invalidated the surrogacy contract because it conflicted
with adoption law, 09 while others held that the adoption statute does not
preclude the surrogacy adoption."'
The refusal of some courts to apply adoption statutes to invalidate
surrogacy agreements may be explained by the notion of technological
continuity. The court in In re Baby Girl3t1 declined to void the surrogacy
agreement, stressed that "[t]he problem is caused by the wife's infertility.
The problem is solved by artificial insemination. The process is not
biologically different from the reverse situation where the husband is
infertile and the wife conceives by artificial insemination."3 2 This could
305. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
306. See id.
307. It should be noted that money did exchange hands before. Semen donors were traditionally
paid for their sperm. However, in the case of surrogacy the person being paid was in the picture
when the baby was born while the sperm donor evaporated into the background at least nine months
beforehand.
308. See In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990).
309. See id.; R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790,796-97 (Mass. 1998).
310. See, eg., Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209, 210-14 (Ky. 1986); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986); In re Adoption of Baby A, 877 P.2d 107 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
311. 505 N.Y.S2d 813 (1986).
312. Id. at 817. See also Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 704 S.W.2d at 212.
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indicate that the acceptance which was reached with regard to AID, as
partial as it was, did to some extent modify the controversy surrounding
the new uses of the technology. However, such statements were the
exception and not the norm even by courts upholding the surrogacy
arrangement. Nevertheless, application of family law principles did not
completely obstruct the validation of surrogacy agreements because the
conflict here did not expressly involve the parental status of the surrogate
or the intended parents and consequently the direct construction of an
alternative family unit.
Apparently, when surrogacy conflicted with the laws controlling the
determination of family roles, the results were more uniform. Such was
the case when surrogacy conflicted with the laws directly regulating AL.
The statutes following the UPA provided that the child born to a married
woman as the result of AI, with the consent of the husband, is considered
to be the legitimate child of the husband and wife. This was obviously in
conflict with the aim of the surrogacy arrangement because it made the
surrogate and her husband (who was not even the natural father) the legal
parents of the born child.313 This provision was of course designed to
prevent the AID donor from acquiring rights and duties as to the AID
child instead of the sterile husband. Ironically, one decade later, the very
law, which was enacted to accommodate Al, served as a double edged
sword. In the case of surrogacy, where the sperm of the intended father
was inseminated in a woman who was not his wife, the law achieved the
absurd result of proclaiming the intended father who was also the natural
father not to be the legal father of the baby. Courts, faced this time with
the disintegration of the concept of motherhood, the traditional primary
caretaker of the child, tended to invalidate the surrogacy agreements on
the basis of these statutes.314
The conclusion that the courts were more likely to enforce the
surrogacy agreement as is when the concept of motherhood was not at
issue is strengthened by the unique role played in surrogacy cases by the
"best interest of the child" test. Courts repeatedly used the best interests
of the child test in surrogacy cases to grant custody to the intended
parents.315 This was done even when the court invalidated the surrogacy
313. Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VIRGINIA L.
REV. 465,476-82 (1983).
314. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994); In re Adoption of
Reams, 557 N.E.2d 159,163-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). But see R.RK, 689 N.E.2d at 795-96 (holding
that the Al statute does not invalidate the surrogacy agreement).
315. See generally Adoption of Baby A, 877 P.2d 107.
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agreement on the basis of adoption statutes. 316 The best interests of the
child test does not focus on the rights of the parents but on the interests
of the child. For example, in In re Baby M, the court restricted its
examination to the family life of the two families and the personalities of
the individuals involved.3" 7 In applying the best interests of the child test,
courts generally did not treat the genetic factor as a presumption in favor
of the natural parent but merely as one factor to be considered among
many others.3 ' Once the genetic factor lost its presumptive power, the
traditional struggle with the concept of motherhood was removed and
courts granted custody to the intended parents.
Although family law principles seemed to furnish mixed results when
applied to surrogacy cases, contract law principles offered uniformity. It
was apparently not the notion of technological continuity which
facilitated legal adjustment to the new use of Al but the application of a
set of legal rules which was not traditionally used to determine parental
status. The application of contract law to traditional surrogacy generally
rendered a legal result which supported the new use of the technology. 39
For example, in In re Adoption of Matthew B.-M.,32 the court refused to
allow the surrogate to withdraw her consent to the adoption by the
intended parent. The court resolved the case on contract principles.32" ' It
refused to accept that she did not know her rights by pointing to a three
and a half hour meeting with an attorney, the explicit language in the
consent for adoption signed by her, and her conduct that gave clear
evidence that she knew the consequences.322 The court also held that a
party to a contract who assumed the risk that the contract will be found
illegal is estopped from arguing for relief on this basis.3"
316. See, e.., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227,1256-61 (N.J. 1988).
317. Id. at 1255-61.
318. See2 AM. JUR. 2DAdoption § 137 (2000).
319. It must be noted, however, that unlike the courts some legislatures employed contract law
terminology to invalidate surrogacy agreements. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2000).
320. 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
321. Id. at 23-29.
322. Id. at 28-29.
323. Id. at 24-25. Although, it must be noted, that the court also reached the result on the basis of
the best interests of the child test. The court maintained that despite the applicability of contract law
principles, the best interest of the child test remains the paramount consideration. Id. at 30. See also
In re Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829, 830-37 (Idaho 1986) (enforcing the surrogacy agreement and stating
the surrogate was estopped from revoking her consent).
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The application of constitutional law principles to surrogacy cases, on
the other hand, did not achieve results similar to those accomplished
through the application of contract law. In several cases, it was argued
that the adoption statutes banning payment for babies were
unconstitutional since they infringed the right to procreate.324 In other
cases, the argument was made that denying procreation where the wife
was infertile while allowing it through AI when the husband was sterile
was a violation of the equal protection clause." s However, the courts
declined to find such statutes unconstitutional. 26 It may very well be that
constitutional law principles lacked the advantage inherent in the entry of
contract law into the debate. Constitutional law principles were already
implicated in the removal of reproduction from sex dispute in the case
law involving contraception and abortion.327 Thus, courts may have been
inhibited from expanding the scope of constitutional protection afforded
to technologies involving the removal of sex from reproduction to
procreation due to considerations related to the parallel debate.328
As can be seen, the determination of whether contract law or family
law was applied was often dispositive of whether the surrogacy
arrangement would be consummated as agreed. Yet, the courts varied as
to the legal doctrine they chose to apply, producing conflicting legal
results.
The debate was further complicated by the invention in 1978 of a new
complementary technology-in vitro fertilization (IVF). The birth of
Louis Brown, the first "test tube baby," was one of the world's leading
media events?29 The new technology was swiftly applied to surrogate
324. See, eg., Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438,439-41 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
325. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253-55 (N.J. 1988).
326. See Kelley, 307 N.W.2d at 441 (holding that the fundamental interest to procreate is not
violated by a state statute which did not prohibit surrogacy but merely the payment of money as part
of the arrangement); Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1253-55 (refusing to enforce a surrogate parenting
agreement did not constitute a denial of equal protection because a sperm donor could not be equated
with a surrogate mother); In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817-18 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990)
(rejecting both the right to procreation and equal protection arguments). See generally Danny R.
Veilleux, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Surrogate Parenting Agreement, 77 A.L.R. 4TH
70(2000).
327. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,481-507 (1965)
328. It is most likely that the debate surrounding AID in the 1940s and 1950s did not extend to
constitutional issues because the debate occurred before Griswold, which re-framed procreation in
terms of privacy and the right to make one's own decisions. See id.
329. See, e.g., Peter Gwynne et al., AllAbout that Baby, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66; Frenzy
in the British Press, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 70; The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at
58.
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motherhood. The application of IVF to surrogacy resulted in a different
state of affairs-both the ovum and the sperm now belonged to the
intended couple, the surrogate who gave birth had no genetic connection
to the born child. This type of surrogacy was called "gestational
surrogacy" as distinguished from AI surrogacy which became known as
"traditional surrogacy."
Despite the distinct difference between the two technologies and their
implications for family relations, neither the courts330 nor the ensuing
legislation distinguished between the two.33t This was especially evident
where legislatures made an effort to separately define the two
technologies but did not go further to evaluate the differentiated effect of
each technology on the resulting family relations.332 Apparently, the AI
technology itself became invisible. Certainly, it was known to be at the
base of the surrogacy procedure but it was no longer really seen and its
technical qualities were no longer taken into consideration. The popular
resort to the term "test tube baby" also ironically reflected this. This was
the very same term which was used to describe AI in the 1940s-1950s.
The technological invisibility of AI and resulting failure to distinguish AI
from the IVF technology within the surrogacy practice had two
consequences. First, it made a resolution based on the continuity
argument, which emphasizes the past acceptance of the practice of AI,
less likely to occur. Second, it prevented the resolution of a tailored legal
solution for each type of surrogacy based on the effect each technology
would have on the resulting family relations.
Statements and publications made by the medical profession
emphasize this second effect of the technological invisibility. Those
330. It must be acknowledged that where IVF technology was at issue, references were made to
the older AI technology. However, this did not happen where AI technology was at issue. In those
cases the technology was no longer really looked at-there are no references to the newer
technology to distinguish its qualities from the older one. See for example, IVF case-law which used
analogies to Al technology: In re Andres A., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Fam. Ct. 1992); See generally
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
331. Kerian, supra note 298, at 145, 149; Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral and International
Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United
States, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 557, 581 (1999). But see In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 893, 894-97, 903 (Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishing between the two types of surrogacy and
hinging its decision on the fact that the intended mother was not the natural one).
332. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-401 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.853 (2001); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. 168-B:1 (2000). Although two statutes do implicitly distinguish between the new
technologies by stating that where pregnancy results from assisted conception the woman who
donated the egg but is not the gestational carrier is the mother. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-19-01 (2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (MICHIE 2001).
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closest to the technology have, in general, not lost sight of it. The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Association in its reports on
reproduction technologies surveyed the practices of AID, traditional
surrogacy, and gestational surrogacy separately. It assessed separate
considerations and recommendations for each according to the
technology at issue. Furthermore, it specifically criticized surrogacy
legislation for failing to make such distinctions.333 Based on this
differentiation, they recommended greater restrictions for traditional
surrogacy where the surrogate is also the genetic mother than for
gestational surrogacy where the intended mother is the genetic mother.
33 1
The physicians' approach demonstrates a middle way which does not
rely on the continuity argument but at the same time is not blindfolded
by the antiquity of the technology.
Notwithstanding its technological clarity of vision, the medical
profession as a whole declined to support the practice of surrogacy.
Physcians views reflected the division of opinions prevalent within the
public at large. Some medical sources supported the practice, albeit
several did so cautiously.335 Some of those supporting the practice
utilized the language of cure. For example, the American Fertility
Society in its cautious and partial support of the practice maintained that
"this process offers promise as the only medical solution to infertility in a
couple of whom the woman has no uterus and who does not produce
eggs or does not want to risk passing on a genetic defect that she
carries. 336 At the same time, many other medical practitioners fiercely
criticized it.
Criticism emerged from both representative bodies and private
medical practitioners. The American Medical Association, for example,
333. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the
New Reproductive Technologies, 46(3) FERTILITY & STERILITY is, 34s-38s, 58s-68s (Supp. 1986);
The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 276, at 10s, 41s-45s, 67s-77s.
This approach appears in other medical sources. See, e.g., Eugene C. Sandberg, Only an Attitude
Away: The Potential of Reproductive Surrogacy, 160(6) AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1441,
1442-44 (1989).
334. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 276, at 67s-77s.
335. See, eg., Leonard J. Weber, Social Responsibility Demands Treating All Patients in Need,
68(2) HEALTH PROGRESS 38 (1987); Sandberg, supra note 333, at 1442-44.
336. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 333, at 67s. It should be
noted that in its 1994 report the Committee somewhat diminished its support for the practice. The
Committee added to its general recommendation a comment stating that due to serious ethical
reservations some members believe that traditional surrogacy cannot be ethically recommended. The
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 276, at 76s.
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concluded that surrogate parenting does not represent a satisfactory
alternative for prospective parents.337 Arguments raised by the medical
professional organizations resembled those made by the public. The
arguments included: the potential depersonalization of reproduction;
adverse consequences for the way society views children; the possibility
of eugenic manipulation; the physical and psychological risks to the
surrogate; the risk of a conflict to the children, including the risk to a
disabled child who may be unwanted by both parents; concern about the
commercial aspect of surrogacy; and the lack of sufficient screening of
prospective parents.338  Furthermore, those opposing surrogacy
supplemented their arguments by stressing that surrogacy is not a cure
for infertility. It was expressly proclaimed that "[s]urrogacy... is neither
curative nor palliative .... Surrogacy arrangements do not restore
function... -339 Additionally, it was openly acknowledged that
participation of health professionals would legitimize the "medical
aspects" of the process.340
Thus, it becomes evident that the medical profession in this case, as in
the case of the use of Al by unmarried women, did not mobilize behind
the practice. To the contrary, the medical profession never did become an
integral part of the practice. The surrogacy practice developed in
entrepreneurial settings, generally apart from medical institutions.
Although the founders of some surrogate mother programs were
physicians, the majority were lawyers, social workers, or people with no
professional training.
341
Legal and social uncertainty related to the application of AI to
surrogacy, thus, continued and prevails to this day. The controversy was
further enflamed through the relatively recent resort to traditional
surrogacy by gay men. This trend, which developed in the 1990s,
enabled gay men to create a family through the application of AI
337. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 127
(Dec. 4-7, 1983).
338. See id. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ETHICAL ISSUES
IN SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLICY STATEMENT, May 1983.
339. John La Puma et al., Surrogacy and Shakespeare: The Merchant's Contract Revisited,
160(1) AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 59, 61 (1989). See also Nadine Taub, Surrogacy: A
Preferred Treatment for Infertility, 16(1-2) L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 89 (1988).
340. Karen H. Rothenberg, Baby M the Surrogacy Contract, and the Health Care Professional:
Unanswered Questions, 16(1-2) L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, 113, 115 (1988).
341. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 276, at 72s.
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technology to surrogacy. 4 Gay surrogacy injected elements from the
parallel AI debate involving single women and lesbians into the
surrogacy controversy.
Resolution of the surrogacy debate is not in sight. As discussed above,
judicial determinations reach conflicting results mostly dependent on
their choice of doctrine. Furthermore, only sixteen states have enacted
statutes addressing some aspect of surrogacy.343 States take one of the
following four positions: (1) surrogacy arrangements are prohibited and
punishable; (2) surrogacy arrangements are permitted but compensation
to the surrogate is prohibited and punished; (3) surrogate contracts are
not specifically made illegal but are viewed as void and unenforceable;
and (4) surrogacy contracts are enforceable provided certain regulatory
measures are met.3"
The technological continuity argument could have facilitated the
acceptance process of this new application of surrogacy. It could have
done so by opening the way to a structured solution based on
differentiation between the two technologies at the basis of the surrogacy
practice?45 However, this form of argument was rarely raised. It is most
likely that the combination of technological invisibility, indirect modes
of control, and incomplete nature of the acceptance of the Al technology
prevented the continuity argument from prevailing.
Apparently where it was the concept of motherhood-the traditional
caretaker-that was visibly fragmented the acceptance achieved through
the earlier AID crisis evaporated. It is ironic that it was the perceived
acceptance of the technology through the resolution of the AID
controversy which produced its invisibility and therefore impeded
acceptance. The application of Al technology to surrogacy has, thus at
large, not significantly benefited from previous acceptance of the
technology and was not assisted, as was the case with AID, from
mobilization by the medical profession. The surrogacy controversy thus
342. See generally Maria J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay
Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183 (1995).
343. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive
Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL . HEALTH CARE L. 147, 167
(2000).
344. Id. at 167-68.
345. Such differentiation would have most likely discriminated against traditional surrogacy
where the surrogate is the genetic mother. This Article does not advocate such a solution. This point
is raised merely to emphasize the effect of invisibility on the potential stabilization and resolution of
the controversy.
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produces further evidence of the partial nature of the acceptance
achieved through the legalization of the AI technology in the 1960s
andl970s.
CONCLUSION
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are already enveloped
by the effects of new technologies on our existing structure of socio-legal
values. The existence of cloning technology and its application to human
cloning threatens our socio-legal concepts of identity and autonomy. The
Internet information revolution has a profound effect on our socio-legal
concept of privacy. And, at the same time, ownership of genetic
information, particularly in human genes, has acted to deeply unsettle our
social and legal notions of property.
Whether we move assertively to meet these challenges or undertake a
more passive approach-we make a choice. These choices may, at times,
be visible, as in the case of the cloning debate, but may also be
undertaken subtly through indirect legal control devices or through
inaction. This Article suggests that, because value laden choices on some
level are always made at the diffusion stage, legal scholarship should not
restrict its focus to the invention and innovation stages of new
technologies and to the economic aspects of the diffusion process.
Academic attention needs to be drawn to fill in the current void in legal
diffusion studies. The role played in AI's struggle for acceptance by
incompatible conceptions of the family demonstrates the particular
significance of extending the inquiry to those cases where values
embedded in the technology prove to be incompatible with the
corresponding prevailing socio-legal values.
This Article proposes a new conceptual approach to guide legal policy
in this relatively unexplored field of diffusion studies. Its first
contribution is the proposal of a general framework for the study of the
diffusion stage. The Article emphasizes the importance of undertaking a
broad approach to the study of the acceptance process, involving the
analysis of the interactions between the technological, the social, and the
legal spheres. It also demonstrates that utilizing this broad approach is
vital to achieving a thorough understanding of the effects of the legal role
on a diffusion process involving incompatibile values. The Article
proposes that further exploration of the diffusion stage through
utilization of this broad approach will be a promising route for
understanding and promoting legal influence on technological progress.
The other contribution of this Article relates specifically to the nature of
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the legal acceptance process. The Article illuminates some of the
concepts that need to guide this inquiry.
First, the Article underscores the possibility that legal acceptance will
be only of an incomplete and temporary nature. It demonstrates that
despite the legalization of AID in the 1960s-1970s, the social
implication of the technology-the creation of alternative family forms
through procreation without resort to sexual relations within the
traditional nuclear family unit-was never fully accepted. This became
evident through the socio-legal reluctance to accept the new applications
of the technology to surrogacy and to the insemination of unmarried
women that emerged in the 1970s, subsequent to the legalization of the
technology.
Second, the acceptance process of AI demonstrates the law's strength
as an inhibitory force and its relative weakness as a technology
promoting device. The law, without an express uniform condemnation of
the practice, but merely through several condemning and contradictory
judgments, legislative silence, and inertia, produced a state of legal
uncertainty which inhibited the diffusion of the practice of Al as it began
to bloom in the 1940s-1950s. On the other hand, the effort to legalize the
use of the technology did not exert such an immediate influence. This
was reflected in the slow change in the procedures used by the physicians
applying the technology and in the eventual reluctance to accept the new
uses of Al in the 1970s.
Third, the extent to which the technology was visible played an
important role in the legal AI discourse. During the earlier history of AI
the technology was visible and its mode of application played a key part
in judicial determinations regarding the technology. However,
subsequent to the legalization of the technology in the 1960s and 1970s,
the technology became invisible. The legal debate dealing with the
application of AI to surrogacy and the use of AI by unmarried women
did not focus on the technology itself and on the fact that the same
technology as before was at stake. Instead it focused on the technology's
social implication-the creation of alternative family forms through
procreation outside the traditional nuclear family. The visibility of the
technology, therefore, determined the type of arguments raised and
considered and to a certain extent the nature of the outcome reached.
Fourth, technological frames of meaning also played an important role
in the technology's legal acceptance debate. The two competing frames
of meaning-the frame of meaning of cure and the frame of meaning of
choice-existed throughout the acceptance process of AL. They appeared
from the very first legal cases and were closely related to the turns in the
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fate of the technology. The shift toward an acceptance of the technology
took place in the 1950s when the physicians uniformly mobilized behind
the frame of meaning of cure and engaged in the promotion of the
technology by arguing that it was a cure for infertility. The frame of
meaning of cure with regard to AD finally prevailed during the
legalization era. At the same time, the reluctance to accept the new uses
of the technology which emerged in the 1970s was closely related to the
absence of a resolution between the two competing frames of meaning.
Society, the law, and importantly the physicians are divided to this day
between the view of these uses as a matter of choice and their perception
as a cure for infertility.
Fifth, the Article identifies the significance of the existence of a
mobilizing social group to attain legal acceptance. The physicians, in
their position as the gatekeepers of the technology, played a key role in
the socio-legal acceptance process of AI as mediators between society
and the law. In the 1950s, they mediated between the social desire to use
the technology and the inhibitions stemming from the prevailing legal
uncertainty and their efforts were vital to the successful diffusion of the
technology. At the same time, the physicians' reluctance to promote the
new applications of the technology in the 1970s was an important factor
in these applications' failure to achieve socio-legal acceptance.
Sixth, the Article highlights the use of alternative legal doctrines as a
vehicle of change and acceptance. The acceptance of AI was impeded
when courts applied traditional family law concepts originally designed
to protect the traditional family unit. On the other hand, the acceptance of
AI was facilitated when courts, instead of reworking family law
concepts, resolved the legal controversy by applying legal doctrines that
were not historically implicated in the protection of the family unit.
Courts adjudicating both AID and traditional surrogacy cases often
applied contract law doctrines in order to facilitate the acceptance of the
technology. The use of contract doctrines that were not inherently
structured to preserve the traditional family unit enabled judicial
resolutions that accepted the technology in its different applications.
The outlined conceptual framework of the legal acceptance debate is
proposed as a first step toward a comprehensive approach that will fill in
the existing void in legal diffusion studies. The formulation of a
comprehensive approach designed to deal with the legal acceptance
debate, in particular with those cases involving incompatible values, will
enable us to approach new and existing technological challenges with
full awareness of the consequences of our choices.
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